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ENVIRONMENTAL "CONTRACTION"
FOR AMERICA?
(OR HOW I STOPPED WORRYING AND
LEARNED TO LOVE THE EPA)
Victor B. Flatt*
The Republican Congress is pushing an extreme anti-
environmental agenda. It would freeze all health and
environmental protection, effectively repeal 25 years of
health protection through a "risk assessment" bill and allow
industry to hold up environmental safeguards through
endless lawsuits. It would even require taxpayers to pay
polluters not to pollute.
- Vice President Albert Gore'
If someone thinks protection of the bald eagle or the
northern spotted owl is important, they ought to be willing
to pay for it.
- U.S. Rep. Lamar S. Smith (R-Tex.)2
The Republicans want to give you the right to sue the
gummint and make all the rest of us pay for the money you
say you will lose by not bein' able to poison our drinkin'
water.
- Molly Ivins, syndicated columnis
* Victor B. Flatt is an Associate Professor at Georgia State University College of
Law. He holds a B.A. in Chemistry and Mathematics from Vanderbilt University and a
J.D. from Northwestern University. He has served as a Law Clerk to the Hon. Danny J.
Boggs, U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and to the Hon. Faye C. Kennedy, Washington
State Court of Appeals. The author wishes to express his gratitude to David Ackerly for
his excellent work in editing this piece.
1. Al Gore, Earth Days Have Become Earth Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at
D17.
2. Tom Kenworthy, House Republicans Push Property-Owner Compensation Bill
Toward Vote, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1995, at A7.
3. Molly Ivins, Unintended Consequences, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 1995, at A21.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With growing alarm or satisfaction, depending on which side of
the fence one's bread is buttered-to mix a couple of favorite meta-
phors-the discussions of the Republican House legislative agenda,
the so-called "Contract with America," have dominated much of the
political discourse of late 1994 and early 1995.' The pitch concerning
4. During the 1994 congressional races, the Republican National Committee proposed
10 pieces of legislation under the title Contract with America. Ronald Brownstein, GOP
Congressional Primary Results Rattle Democrats: Confident Republicans Prepare for an
Election Earthquake by Laying Out Alternatives to Clinton Agenda, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1994, at A5. One such proposal was the precursor to House Bill 9. The full text can be
found in Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) 235 d89, Dec. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BNA File [hereinafter Proposed H.R. 91.
Representatives Archer, DeLay, Saxton, and Smith (Wash.) introduced House Bill
9 on January 4, 1995, 141 CONG. REC. H161 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1995), with the short title
Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., available
in GPO Access on the Internet at URL <http://ssdc.ucsd.edu/cgibin/SFgpo?waisdoc=
1&4=wais.access.gpo.gov.;104-cong-bilsTEXT/185731/3=0 /%201857310 % 20/diska/wais/
data/I04_congbills/h9ih.txt> [hereinafter Introduced H.R. 9]. Introduced H.R. 9
contained the following titles:
Title I - Capital Gains Reform, Title II - Neutral Cost Recovery; Title III - Risk
Assessment and Cost/Benefit Analysis for New Regulations; Title IV - Establishment of
Federal Regulatory Budget Cost Control; Title V - Strengthening of Paperwork
Reduction Act; Title VI - Strengthening Regulatory Flexibility; Title VII - Regulatory
Impact Analyses; Title VIII - Protection Against Federal Regulatory Abuse; Title IX -
Private Property Rights Protections and Compensation; Title X - Establishment of
Federal Mandate Budget Cost Control; Title XI - Taxpayer Debt Buy-Down; Title XII
- Small Business Incentives.
In February Representative Clinger introduced the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
H.R. 830, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The House passed the act later that month. 141
CONG. REC. H2029 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1995). Representative Canady introduced the
Private Property Protection Act of 1995. H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The
House passed this bill in early March. 141 CONG. REc. H2607 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995).
Representative Gekas introduced the Regulatory Reform and Relief Act in mid-
February. H.R. 926, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The House passed this bill on March
1st. 141 CONG. REC. H2443 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995). In late February, Representative
Walker introduced the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995. H.R. 1022, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The bill passed five days later. 141 CONG. REc. H2372 (daily ed.
Feb. 28, 1995).
After the House passed these four bills, Representative DeLay moved to strike all
the text of Introduced H.R. 9 following the short title. Id. at H2623 (daily ed. Mar. 3,
1995). A new House Bill 9 was formed from the four pieces of legislation passed
previously. H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Passed H.R. 9]. House Bill
830 became Division A; House Bill 925 became Division B; House Bill 926 became
Division C; and House Bill 1022 became Division D. 141 CONG. REc. H2623 (daily ed.
Mar. 3, 1995). The House passed the new House Bill 9 by a vote of 277 to 141. Id. at
H2638-39 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995).
ENVIRONMENTAL "CONTRACTION?"
the impact of the Contract .with America on the environment, and
particularly environmental regulations and rulemaking, has grown
loud indeed. According to a New York Times headline of December
25, 1994, "Republicans Plan Sweeping Barriers to New U.S. Rules."5
In spite of the attention, uproar, and hand wringing about the
disastrous effects on the environment intended by the new Republican
congressional majority, there has been little serious consideration of
the actual, detailed changes that the proposed Contract with America
language will cause environmental programs. It is possible that
speculation about the demise of environmental programs is prema-
ture.
Though the Contract with America was initially proposed as ten
separate bills, the final text of any of these bills is speculative. Any
bill proposed by the House must be voted on by both Houses of
Congress and presented to the President for signature. Some changes
are inevitable. Indeed, at the time that this paper is being written, at
least one of the programs at issue to environmentalists-regulatory
takings-has been explicitly modified from the proposed Contract
with America language in order to secure passage in the House of
Representatives.
6
More importantly, for purposes of discussing the impact of the
Contract with America, the mere passage of a bill does not ensure the
creation of a policy. From the major news media's discussion of the
Contract with America, one would assume that the Contract
represents either an unmitigated assault on the environmental
regulatory framework as we know it or a complete protection of the
environment that simply lifts the burden of onerous regulations from
the back of the common working people. Obviously the proposed
legislation does not represent both, and as yet there has been no
consensus as to which it represents. Part of the problem is that the
proposals cannot be understood if seen only in the abstract. Most
discussions of the bill and proposed impact have been based on the
crudest understanding of how the intentions of Congress are translat-
ed into legal effect. We have long since moved from the time-if we
were ever there-when federal policy was solely dictated by Congress.
The policy impacts are instead a complex mixture of congressional
legislation, executive branch agency implementation, and federal court
5. John H. Cushman, Jr., Republicans Plan Sweeping Barriers to New U.S. Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 1994, at Al.
6. Kenworthy, supra note 2, at A7.
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interpretation of that law and its implementation. This mixture makes
the prediction of an outcome of a proposed law more complicated,
and allows groups an opportunity to try to alter the intended, or one
of the intended, consequences of the law by using the other branches
of government as a check or balance on Congress.
The parts of the proposed legislation from the Contract with
America that have most concerned environmentalists are found in the
section with the interesting moniker "Job Creation."7 This proposed
Act includes requirements that all federal regulations be created and
administered in a cost-beneficial fashion,8 that the owners of property
7. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4. The unfunded mandates provision was
introduced as a separate portion of the Contract with America, The Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995. H.R. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The House passed this act on
February 1. 1995. 141 CONG. REC. H1006 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995). For a discussion of the
policy statement of this act, see infra note 141. The House then passed Senate 1, a similar
measure with the same short title, after it was modified to include language from
Introduced H.R. 9. 141 CONG. REc. at H1012 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995). The Senate agreed
to a conference report. Id. at S3922 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995). The House passed the
conference report the next day. Id. at H3313 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1995). President Clinton
signed the bill on March 22, 1995. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-4, 109 Stat. 48.
8. Proposed H.R. 9, stipra note 4, § 3201(a)(4)(C). The cost-benefit provision of the
bill as introduced read:
SEC. 3201. ANALYSIS OF RISK REDUCTION BENEFITS AND COSTS,
(a) In General.-Except as provided in subsection (b), the President shall
require each executive branch agency to prepare the following for each major
rule designed to protect human health, safety, or the environment that is
proposed or promulgated by the agency after the date of enactment of this Act:
(5) For each final rule, a certification by the head of the agency of
each of the following:
(C) A certification that the rule will produce benefits to human
health or the environment that will justify the costs incurred by local
and State governments, the Federal Government, and other public and
private entities as a result of implementation of and compliance with
the rule.
Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 3201(a). See infra note 17 for a complete version of
this section. The House passed the following provision:
(a) In General.-The President shall require each Federal agency to prepare
the following for each major rule within a program designed to protect human
health, safety, or the environment that is proposed or promulgated by the agency
after the date of enactment of this division:
(3) A statement that places in context the nature and magnitude of the
risks to be addressed and the residual risks likely to remain for each
alternative strategy identified or considered by the agency. Such statement
shall, to the extent feasible, provide comparisons with estimates of greater,
lesser, and substantially equivalent risks that are familiar to and routinely
encountered by the general public as well as other risks, and, where
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be compensated for a regulatory reduction in the property's market
value,9 that all federal mandates on state and local government be
appropriate and meaningful, comparisons of those risks with other similar
risks regulated by the Federal agency resulting from comparable activities
and exposure pathways. Such comparisons should consider relevant dis-
tinctions among risks, such as the voluntary or involuntary nature of risks
and the preventability or nonpreventability of risks.
(4) For each final rule, an analysis of whether the identified benefits
of the rule are likely to exceed the identified costs of the rule.
Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 421(a)(3)-(4). For the text of the risk assessment portions
of this legislation, see infra note 49. See infra notes 16-81 and accompanying text for a
complete discussion of the cost-benefit analysis requirement.
9. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 9001-9002. The protection for private property
rights read:
SEC. 9001. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.
It is the purpose of this title to compensate private property owners with
respect to certain actions that are taken by the Federal Government for public
purposes and that limit the use of private property by property owners.
SEC. 9002. COMPENSATION FOR FEDERAL AGENCY INFRINGEMENT
OR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY.
(a) Eligibility.-
(1) In general.-A private property owner is entitled to receive
compensation from the United States. in accordance with this section for any
agency infringement or deprivation of rights to property that is owned by
the private property owner.
(2) Agency infringement or deprivation of rights to property de-
fined.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "agency infringement or
deprivation of rights to property" means a limitation or condition that-
(A) is imposed by a final agency action on a use of property that
would be lawful but for the agency action, and
(B) results in a reduction in the value of the property equal to ten
percent or more.
(3) Circumstances in which compensation not required.-A private
property owner shall not be entitled to receive compensation under this
subsection for any of the following:
(A) A limitation on any action that would constitute a violation
of applicable State or local law (including an action that would violate
a local zoning ordinance or would constitute a nuisance under any
applicable State or local law).
(B) A limitation on any use of private property, imposed
pursuant to a determination by the President that the use poses or
would pose a serious and imminent threat to public health and safety
or to the health andsafety of workers, or other individuals, lawfully on
the property.
(C) A limitation imposed pursuant to the Federal navigational
servitude.
(4) Limitation on cumulative amount of compensation.-No payment
may be made pursuant to this subsection with respect to property if the sum
of such payment and all other payments made pursuant to this subsection
with respect to the property would exceed the fair market value of the
property (as determined at the time of the payment).
(5) State or local limitations imposed pursuant to federal man-
dates.-A limitation or condition shall be considered to be a Federal agency
infringement or deprivation of rights to property for purposes of paragraph
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(1) if it is a consequence of a limitation or condition on the use of theproperty by the private property owner that is imposed by a State or localgovernment pursuant to an agency action that is intended to, or does, bind
the State or local government.
(b) Request for Compensation.-Within 90 days after receipt of notice ofan agency action with respect to which compensation is required undersubsection (a), a private property owner may submit to the head of the agencya request in writing for compensation under this section.
(c) Agency Determination and Offer.-
(1) In general.-Upon receipt of a request for compensation, submittedin accordance with subsection (b), with respect to an agency action affectingprivate property as described in subsection (a), the head of the agency thattook the action shall determine whether the private property ownersubmitting the request has demonstrated entitlement to compensation undersubsection (a). If the head of the agency finds that the private propertyowner has so demonstrated, the head of the agency shall offer to compen-sate the private property owner for the reduction in the value of theproperty, as demonstrated by the private property owner.
(2) Timing of determination and offer.-The head of an agency shallmake the determination and offer, if any, required by paragraph (1) withrespect to a request for compensation not later than 180 days after receiving
the request.
(i) Source of Payment Funds.-
(1) Use of agency funds.-Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and(3), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, any payment madepursuant to subsection (a) shall be paid from the annual appropriation ofthe agency or agencies taking the action for which the payment is required.
For the purpose of making such a payment, the head of the agency maytransfer or reprogram any funds available to the agency.
Id. The House passed a less stringent version on March 3, 1995:
SEC. 202. FEDERAL POLICY AND DIRECTION.
(a) General Policy.-It is the policy of the Federal Government that no lawor agency action should limit the use of privately owned property so as to
diminish its value.
(b) Application to Federal Agency Action.-Each Federal agency, officer,and employee should exercise Federal authority to ensure that agency action willnot limit the use of privately owned property so as to diminish its value.
SEC. 203. RIGHT TO COMPENSATION.
(a) In General.-The Federal Government shall compensate an owner ofproperty whose use of any portion of that property has been limited by anagency action, under a specified regulatory law, that diminishes the fair marketvalue of that portion by 20 percent or more. The amount of the compensationshall equal the diminution in value that resulted from the agency action. If thediminution in value of a portion of that property is greater than 50 percent, atthe option of the owner, the Federal Government shall buy that portion of the
property for its fair market value.
(b) Duration of Limitation on Use.-Property with respect to whichcompensation has been paid under this Act shall not thereafter be used contraryto the limitation imposed by the agency action, even if that action is laterrescinded or otherwise vitiated. However, if that action is later rescinded orotherwise vitiated, and the owner elects to refund the amount of the compensa-tion, adjusted for inflation, to the Treasury of the United States, the property
may be so used.
Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 202-203. See infra notes 82-139 and accompanying textfor a complete discussion of the Private Property Rights Protection and Compensation
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paid for by the federal government, 0 and that the overall "cost
burden" of regulations to private parties and the states be reduced."
Act.
10. The original Contract with America proposal contained an unfunded mandate
section. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 10502, 10506. After introduction in the House,
it was removed to a separate piece of legislation. See supra note 7 for the history of the
Unfunded Mandates Act. The original statement of policy for unfunded mandates as
proposed in the House read:
SEC. 10502. LIMITATION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL
MANDATES.
A Federal agency that is responsible for implementing, enforcing, or
otherwise applying a Federal mandate shall apply the Federal mandate only to
the extent that the head of the agency determines that State and local
governments to which the Federal mandate would apply have been provided
Federal resources equivalent to the intergovernmental direct costs of the Federal
mandate.
Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 10502. The definition of a federal mandate was:
(A) subject to subparagraph (B), [a federal mandate] means a requirement
under Federal statute or regulation that a State or local government, or both,
undertake an activity or provide a service; and
(B) does not include any Federal statute or regulation that-
(i) enforces the constitutional rights of individuals, or
(ii) establishes or enforces any statutory prohibition against discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, religion, gender, national origin, age, or handi-
capped or disability status.
Id. § 10506(2). An unfunded federal mandate was defined as:
(A) a Federal mandate other than one that relates to a program described
in subparagraph (B)(i), and-
(i) which requires that a State or local government, or both, undertake
an activity or provide a service; and
(ii) for which the Federal Government does not provide sufficient
funds to undertake such activity or provide such service; or
(B) a Federal mandate-
(i) that relates to a Federal program under which $500,000,000 or more
is provided annually to State and local governments under entitlement
authority (as defined in section 622(9) of title 2, United States Code),
(ii) which requires that a State or local government, or both, undertake
an activity or provide a service; and
(iii) (I) with respect to which the failure to undertake such activity or
provide such service would result in a reduction of Federal financial or
technical assistance to the State or local government; or
(11) would impose costs on a State or local government that exceed the
amount of Federal financial assistance provided to the State or local
government under the program.
Id. § 10506(3). For a complete discussion of the Unfunded Mandates Bill, see infra notes
140-61 and accompanying text.
11. Id. § 4001(a). This section inserted the following section in the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of titles 2 and 31 U.S.C.):
"SEC. 321. OMB-CBO REPORTS.
"(a) OMB-CBO INITIAL REPORT.-Within 1 year after the date of
enactment of this section, OMB and CBO shall jointly issue a report to the
President and each House of Congress that contains the following:
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In addition, the Republican majority plans new procedural rules that
would allow citizens or companies affected by regulations-including
environmental regulations-to challenge these regulations in different
ways, and at different times, prior to final agency action.'
"(1) For the first budget year beginning after the issuance of this
report, a projection of the aggregate direct cost to the private sector of
complying with all Federal regulations and rules in effect immediately
before issuance of the report containing the projection for that budget year
of the effect of current-year Federal regulations and rules into the budget
year and the outyears based on those regulations and rules.
"(2) A calculation of the estimated aggregate direct cost to the private
sector of compliance with all Federal regulations and rules as a percentage
of the gross domestic product (GDP).
"(3) The estimated marginal cost (measured as a reduction in estimated
gross domestic product) to the private sector of compliance with all Federal
regulations and rules in excess of 5 percent of the gross domestic product.
"(4) The effect on the domestic economy of different types of Federal
regulations and rules.
"(5) The appropriate level of personnel, administrative overhead, and
programmatic savings that should be achieved on a fiscal year by fiscal year
basis by Federal agencies that issue regulations or rules with direct costs to
the private sector through the reduction of such aggregate costs to the
private sector by equal percentage increments in the 6 years following the
budget year until the aggregate level of such costs does not exceed 5
percent of the estimated gross domestic product for the same fiscal year as
the estimated costs that will be incurred.
"(6) Recommendations for budgeting, technical, and estimating changes
to improve the Federal regulatory budgeting process.
"(b) UPDATE REPORTS.-OMB and CBO shall issue update reports on
September 15th of the fifth year beginning after issuance of the initial report and
at 5-year intervals thereafter containing all the information required in the initial
report, but based upon all Federal regulations and rules in effect immediately
before issuance of the most recent update report.
"(c) INITIAL BASELINE REPORT.-Within 30 days after the date of
enactment of this section, OMB and CBO shall jointly issue a report to the
President and each House of Congress that contains an initial aggregate
regulatory baseline for the first budget year that begins at least 120 days after
that date of enactment. That baseline will be a projection of the aggregate direct
cost to the private sector of complying with all Federal regulations and rules in
effect immediately before issuance of the report containing the projection for
that budget year of the effect of current-year Federal regulations and rules into
the budget year and the outyears based on those regulations and rules."
Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 4001(a)-(c). For a complete discussion of the provision
to limit the private sector's cost for regulatory compliance, see infra notes 162-80 and
accompanying text.
12. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 7003(a)(2), 7008, 8202-8203, 8207. The bill
proposed amending the hearing requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 553 to include a new subsection
(g): "If more than 100 interested persons acting individually submit comments to an
agency regarding any rule proposed by the agency, the agency shall hold a public hearing
on the proposed rule." Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 7003(a)(2) (amending 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1994)). The original proposal contained a provision deleted from the version
introduced in the House: "Whoever is adversely affected by any conduct in violation of
this title may in a civil action obtain appropriate relief. The court may award a prevailing
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plaintiff in an action under this section a reasonable attorney's fees as a part of the costs."
Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 7008.
The section of Introduced H.R. 9 covering whistleblowers in the private sector
contained the following provisions:
SEC. 8202. PURPOSE.
The Federal regulatory system should be implemented consistent with the
principle that any person subject to Government regulation should be protected
against reprisal for disclosing information that the person believes is indicative
of-
(1) violation or inconsistent application of any law, rule, regulation,
policy, or internal standard;
(2) arbitrary action or other abuse of authority;
(3) mismanagement;
(4) waste or misallocation of resources;
(5) inconsistent, discriminatory or disproportionate enforcement
proceedings;
(6) endangerment of public health or safety;
(7) personal favoritism; and
(8) coercion for partisan political purposes; by any agency or its
employees.
SEC. 8203. COVERAGE.
This subtitle shall apply to:
(1) Any agency of the Federal Government as defined in section 551
of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Any agency of a State government that exercises authority under
Federal law, or that exercises authority under State law establishing a
program approved by a Federal agency as a substitute for or supplement to
a program established by Federal law.
Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 8202-8203. The same title contained a provision for
citizen suits.
SEC. 8207. CITIZEN SUITS.
(a) Commencement.-Any person injured or threatened by a prohibited
regulatory practice may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any
person or agency alleged to have engaged in or threatened to engage in such
practice.
(b) Jurisdiction and Venue.-Any action under subsection (a) of this section
shall be brought in the district court for any district in which the alleged
prohibited regulatory practice occurred or in which the alleged injury occurred.
The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to-
(1) restrain any agency or person who has engaged or is engaging in
any prohibited regulatory practice;
(2) order the cancellation or remission of any penalty, fine, damages,
or other monetary assessment that resulted from a prohibited regulatory
practice;
(3) order' the rescission of any settlement that resulted from a
prohibited regulatory practice;
(4) order the issuance of any permit or license that has been denied
or delayed as a result of a prohibited regulatory practice;
(5) order the agency and/or the employee engaging in a prohibited
regulatory practice to pay to the injured person such damages as may be
necessary to compensate the person for any harm resulting from the
practice, including damages for-
(A) injury to, deterioration of, or destruction of real or personal
property;
January 1996]
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In this Article, I will first examine the parts of the proposed act
that may affect the environment and try to predict what the actual
impact of the laws-after agency and court interaction-would be on
the environment if implemented. Second, from the perspective of one
who believes that the impacts of the proposed law may indeed be
harmful to the environment, I will explore what possibilities-that is,
legal theories concerning agency implementation or direct challenges
in court-might be available to temper or change the possible impacts
of the proposed regulatory changes.
A true analysis of impacts and solutions must look at the actual
implemented text. 3 However, the legislative intent as represented
by the original text proposal is important as well. These announced
intentions represent specific policies that will likely survive into
another legislative session even if this Congress fails to pass them or
the President ultimately vetoes them. 4 There is enough information
in the form of the proposed text and the stated goals of the proposals,
that it makes sense to discuss the Contract with America, its effects,
and the possible responses to it.' 5
(B) loss of profits from idle or underutilized resources, and from
business forgone;
(C) costs incurred, including costs of compliance where appropri-
ate;
(D) loss in value of a business;
(E) reasonable legal, consulting and expert witness fees; or
(F) payments to third parties;
(6) order the payment of punitive damages, in an amount not to
exceed $25,000 for each such prohibited regulatory practice, provided that,
in the case of a continuing prohibited regulatory practice, each day that the
practice continues shall be deemed a separate practice.
Id. § 8207. For a complete discussion of alterations to procedural rules for challenging
agency actions see infra notes 64-81 & 181-97 and accompanying text.
13. The final text is not currently available and, as noted in footnotes 4 and 7-12,
already appears headed for a different textual incarnation.
14. The original bills have shown strong resiliency so far in the legislative arena with
most of the substantive thrusts intact after textual changes.
15. This Article will try to note explicit changes from the original legislative proposals
where they have occurred.
[Vol., 29:585
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II. WHAT MIGHT THE CONTRACT WITH AMERICA Do AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT
A. Requirement of Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Positive Net Impact of Regulations
The first part of the proposed Job Creation section of the
Contract with America that concerns environmentalists is the
requirement that all new federal regulations, and amendments to
regulations, 6 be subject to cost-benefit analysis. Further, environ-
mental regulations must be certified by the federal agency that
proposed them as producing "benefits to human health or the
environment that will justify the costs incurred by local and State
governments, the Federal Government, and other public and private
entities as a result of implementation of and compliance" with the
rules for determining costs and benefits.'" To ensure that agencies
16. The term "amendment" is not defined in the statutory scheme governing the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994), but is logically seen as a substantive
change in a regulation.
17. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 3201(a)(5)(C). The full text as introduced in
the House read:
SEC. 3201. ANALYSIS OF RISK REDUCTION BENEFITS AND COSTS.
(a) In General.-Except as provided in subsection (b), the President shall
require each executive branch agency to prepare the following for each major
rule designed to protect human health, safety, or the environment that is
proposed or promulgated by the agency after the date of enactment of this Act:
(1) For each such proposed or promulgated rule, an assessment of
incremental costs and incremental risk reduction or other benefits
associated with each significant regulatory alternative considered by the
agency in connection with the rule or proposed rule.
(2) For each such proposed or promulgated rule, to the extent feasible,
a comparison of any human health, safety, or environmental risks addressed
by the regulatory alternatives to other risks chosen by the head of the
agency, including at least 3 other risks regulated by the agency and to at
least 3 other risks with which the public is familiar.
(3) For each such proposed or promulgated rule, a statement of other
human health risks potentially posed by implementing or complying with
the regulatory alternatives, including substitution risks.
(4) For each final rule, an assessment of the costs and risk reduction
or other benefits associated with implementation of, and compliance with,
the rule.
(5) For each final rule, a certification by the head of the agency of
each of the following:
(A) A certification that the assessment under paragraph (4) is
based on an objective and unbiased scientific and economic evaluation
of all significant and relevant information provided to the agency by
interested parties relating to the costs, risks, and risk reduction or
other benefits addressed by the rule. Such information shall have been
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effectively follow this provision, the risk and cost-benefit analyses
must be approved by independent peer review panels.' 8
subjected to peer review to the extent required by section 3301.
(B) A certification that the rule will substantially advance the
purpose of protecting human health or the environment, as applicable,
against the risk addressed by the rule.
(C) A certification that the rule will produce benefits to
human health or the environment that will justify the costs incurred by
local and State governments, the Federal Government, and other
public and private entities as a result of implementation of and
compliance with the rule, as determined under paragraph (1).
(D) A certification that there is no regulatory alternative that is
allowed by the statute under which the regulation is promulgated that
would achieve an equivalent reduction in risk in a more cost-effective
manner, along with a brief explanation of why other regulatory
alternatives that were considered by the head of the agency were
found to be less cost-effective.
Id. § 3201(a).
18. Id. § 3301. The text as introduced in the House read:
SEC. 3301. PEER REVIEW PROGRAM.
(a) Establishment.-For regulatory programs addressing human health,
safety, or the environment, the head of each Federal agency shall develop a
systematic program for peer review of risk assessments and economic assess-
ments used by the agency. Such program shall be applicable across the agency
and-
(1) shall provide for the creation of peer review panels consisting of
independent and external experts who are broadly representative and
balanced to the extent feasible;
(2) may provide for differing levels of peer review depending on the
significance or the complexity of the problems or the need for expeditious-
ness;
(3) shall not exclude peer reviewers merely because they represent
entities that may have a potential interest in the outcome, provided that
interest is fully disclosed to the agency; and
(4) shall provide open opportunity to become part of a peer review
panel at a minimum by soliciting nominations through a Federal Register
announcement.
(b) Requirement for Peer Review.-Each Federal agency shall provide for
peer review of scientific and economic information used for purposes of any
evaluation under section 3201(a)(5)(A) or for purposes of any significant risk or
cost assessment prepared in connection with a major rule. In addition, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall order that peer review
be provided for any major risk assessment or cost assessment that may have a
significant impact on public policy decisions.
(c) Contents.-
(1) In general.-Each peer review under this section shall include a
report to the Federal agency concerned with respect to each of the
following:
(A) An evaluation of the technical, scientific, and economic merit
of the data and methods used for the assessment and analysis.
(B) A list of any considerations that were not taken into account
in the assessment and analysis, but were considered appropriate by a
majority of the members of the peer review panel.
(C) A discussion of the methodology used for the assessment and
analysis.
(Vol. 29:585
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Although the proposed legislation applies generally to all
regulations, environmental regulations would seem to be particularly
affected because they represent the majority of regulations not
currently subject to a cost-benefit analysis requirement. 9 For
example, in the explanatory book Contract with America,2 the Clean
Air Act"' is singled out as an offender.
(2) Comments and appendix.-Each peer review report under this
subsection shall include-
(A) all comments supported by a majority of the members of the
peer review panel submitting the report; and
(B) an appendix which sets forth the dissenting opinions that any
peer review panel member wants to express.
(3) Separation of assessments.-Peer review of human health, safety,
environmental, and economic assessments may be separated for purpose of
this subtitle.
(d) Response to Peer Review.-The head of the Federal agency shall
provide a written response to all significant peer review comments.
(e) Availability to Public.-All peer review comments or conclusions and
the agency's responses shall be made available to the public and shall be made
part of the administrative record for purposes of judicial review of any final
agency action.
(f) Previously Reviewed Data and Analysis.-No peer review shall be
required under this section for any data or analysis which has been previously
subjected to peer review or for any component of any evaluation or assessment
previously subjected to peer review.
(g) National Panels.-The President shall appoint National Peer Review
Panels to annually review the risk assessment and cost assessment practices of
each Federal agency for programs designed to protect human health, safety, or
the environment. The Panel shall submit a report to the Congress no less
frequently than annually containing the results of such review.
(h) Major Rule Defined.-For purposes of this section, the term "major
rule" has the same meaning as provided by section 3201(c) except that
"$100,000,000" shall be substituted for "$25,000,000".
Id. § 3301. The original text of the Contract with America included a separate section
requiring a second peer review if the first panel rejected the data or methods used to
compile the first report.
If a peer review panel established under this subtitle includes in a report
under section 3302 for a proposed major rule a negative recommendation
regarding the data or methods used for a risk assessment cost/benefit analysis on
which the major rule is based, the proposed major rule may not be issued in final
form unless the head of the agency which proposed the major rule-
(1) prepares a new risk assessment or cost/benefit analysis, as
applicable, for the proposed major rule in accordance with this title; and (2)
submits the new assessment and analysis for peer review in accordance with
this subtitle.
Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 3303.
19. See FREDERICK ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
POLICY 593 (2d ed. 1990).
20. REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 126 (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a discussion of the effect of
the Unfunded Mandates Act on the Clean Air Act, see infra notes 146-49 and accompany-
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According to those who signed the Contract with America the
proposal was meant to stop regulation that does not truly provide an
overall net benefit to the American people. As phrased by the
proposers, while this cost-benefit analysis requirement may mean that
certain environmental and health and safety regulations will be
repealed, it will make more resources available to save lives or
provide benefits elsewhere.
Thus the presumption is that if Congress passes the environmen-
tal reforms within the Contract with America, they will alter federal
environmental regulation. However, a close examination of environ-
mental laws as they now exist-and as the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the states currently implement them-indicates
that passage of this part of the Contract with America will cause little
change to existing environmental regulation.
1. The law, by its own terms, does not apply
to environmental regulation
Although this proposed legislation seems broad in its scope, it
limits its own applicability in a way that seems contradictory to the
description of the bill in the book, Contract with America,"2 and
contradictory to some of the publicly expressed purposes of the bill.
Specifically, in the opening section of the proposed legislation the so-
called "savings provision" provides that "[n]othing in this subtitle shall
be construed to modify any statutory standard or requirement
designed to protect health, safety, or the environment."'  This
savings provision seems to say that unless an existing law that protects
the environment has specifically required a cost-benefit analysis, the
proposed requirements to perform a cost-benefit analysis in order to
regulate under that law do not apply. Thus, even though the Contract
with America singled out the Clean Air Act as one of the laws that
created the need for this proposed bill because it required regulation
without regard to costs,24 the proposed legislation would, by its own
terms, have no impact. In effect, the proposed bill would not change
the procedures of executive branch agencies that are already subject
ing text.
22. REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., supra note 20, 126-41.
23. Introduced H.R. 9. supra note 4, § 3103(c).
24. REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., supra note 20, at 126.
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to cost-benefit analysis by executive order unless such analysis is
specifically forbidden by law.'
This savings provision was probably designed to allow the bill's
proponents to state that they are not going to harm human health,
safety, or the environment, but by the same token they will not
change the agency cost-benefit analysis that they have so criticized.
One could argue that provisions in laws, such as the Clean Air Act,
that do not allow a cost-benefit analysis are not designed to protect
human life or the environment because in some general way they
misallocate funds that could be used to save lives elsewhere.
However, this is a very weak argument given that the preambles and
legislative history of most of the environmental laws, including the
Clean Air Act, specifically note that Congress passed these laws to
protect human health and the environment.
Another possible argument that the proposed law would still
affect environmental regulation is if one construes the savings clause
to apply only in cases where prior legislation has set actual numerical
standards for direct regulation in the fields of human health and the
environment. Title III does not define the terms "standard" or
"requirement." But the clear meaning of these words, particularly the
word "requirement," would indicate that it applies more broadly than
legislation merely designed to protect human health and the environ-
ment in a certain way through numerical standards. It seems that
environmentalists have little to fear from the proposed law requiring
cost-benefit analysis because environmental regulation will be
exempted.
What then does one make of Title III and this "savings"
provision? The title certainly expresses congressional intent to be
more logical about cost-benefit analysis. It further provides an
enforcement mechanism for ensuring such cost-benefit analysis is
more onerous and perhaps more effective than what currently exists
under executive orders. Perhaps the savings provision limiting the
application of the proposed bill will be narrowly construed, or more
likely, will be dropped altogether. In that case, Title III would
require that all laws, including environmental laws, only allow
regulation that is cost-beneficial. If this occurs, will the changes be
25. For further discussion of executive orders requiring cost-benefit analysis, see infra
note 28 and accompanying text.
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great? Would this kind of law, if applicable to all environmental
regulation, threaten environmental protection?
Without the savings provision, the scope of the law would
certainly encompass environmental regulations. Although the
proposed legislation only applies to rules taking effect after the
passage of the bill,26 the applicability of the legislation will probably
affect environmental laws with greater force than would appear at
first glance. Although regulations enforcing most of the major federal
environmental laws have already been implemented, very few
regulations remain unchanged for long, and an alteration of standards
or simply a need to introduce more cost-effective standards might
trigger the requirement of a cost-benefit analysis. The only baseline
criteria is that it be a major rule; however, the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) does not define a major rule. The APA
defines a "rule" as:
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to imple-
ment, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
agency and includes the approval or prescription for the
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or
reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services
or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting,
or practices bearing on any of the foregoing."
Therefore, the fact that this law would only apply to new major rules
does not really lessen its impact. However, even if applied fully to all
environmental laws, the requirement of a cost-benefit analysis would
not really change environmental regulation.
2. Even if the law covered environmental regulation,
its impact would not be great because the EPA
already uses cost-benefit analysis
By executive order, all federal agencies are required, and have
been required for sixteen years, to prepare a cost-benefit analysis on
all federal regulations absent a specific prohibition of such analysis.2"
26. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 3201(a).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994).
28. Cost-benefit analysis for executive branch agencies was first implemented by
President Jimmy Carter. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978). President
Reagan issued a similar directive, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), and
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Relatively few federal environmental laws prohibit a cost-benefit
analysis. However, the exceptions are important and include the
Endangered Species Act of 19739 and the Clean Air Act.3" The
Endangered Species Act states that no animal listed as endangered
should be "taken, 3' and that no habitat crucial to species survival
should be destroyed.32 The Job Creation bill makes no provision for
consideration of economic hardship on these issues. Similarly, the
Clean Air Act requires that the EPA consider public health, not
economic hardship of compliance, when creating ambient air quality
standards.33
Yet even when these environmental laws do not allow the use of
cost-benefit analysis in regulation, the EPA practices cost-benefit
analysis anyway.' In the book EPA: Asking the Wrong Questions,
authors Marc Landy, Marc Roberts, and Stephen Thomas describe
how cost-benefit considerations were factored into the EPA's decision
to alter the ozone standard from .08 parts per million (ppm) to .12
ppm, even though such a consideration was explicitly forbidden by
statute." The EPA's justification for considering economics in
standard setting is that one can presumably equalize money spent on
health maximization by shifting scarce resources to save human lives.
Although the federal courts did not approve the explicit use of cost-
benefit analysis in the ozone case, they did approve the final ozone
ambient air quality standard.36 Similarly, in Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. United States EPA,37 the D.C. Circuit
determined that because scientific uncertainty exists with respect to
President Clinton issued the same directive, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735
(1993).
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C). The Endangered Species Act defines "take" as "to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct." Id. § 1532(19).
32. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1988).
34. See id. (stating that the goal of the Clean Air Act is to protect human health).
35. MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING
THE WRONG QUESTIONS 65, 70 (1990).
36. See American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982). In so doing, they did not examine the real reasons for the
EPA's final decision, but simply noted that the EPA Administrator's decision was based
on a "rational" margin of safety. Id. at 1187. The breadth of the margin of safety was not
specified. Id.
37. 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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carcinogenic air pollutants, the EPA Administrator did not have to set
the exposure level to zero and could, therefore, presumably consider
economic impacts of various possible safety levels.38
The EPA's regulation of sulfur dioxide production at nonferrous
smelters provides another example of the EPA's current practice of
cost-benefit analysis. Before Congress explicitly allowed consideration
of the possible economic impact of certain sulfur dioxide control
standards, the EPA had already specified dispersion of sulfur dioxide
clouds as a pollution abatement technique because a steady-state
control would not have been economically feasible and would have
resulted in closures of plants and perhaps shutdowns of entire
industries.39 Even though the EPA specifically noted that the use of
dispersion techniques adequately protected public health according to
its statutory mandate, cost-benefit analysis clearly dictated where, on
the line of uncertainty, the EPA would set its sulfur dioxide produc-
tion safety standard.' Some of the federal courts, analyzing the
standard, acknowledged that economic feasibility was considered in
the determination to allow the use of dispersion techniques to
temporarily meet Clean Air Act requirements.4'
Because the EPA has great flexibility in setting standards, and
because the health effects of so many pollutants are uncertain, the
EPA can quietly use the cost-benefit impact of various regulatory
alternatives to choose between two levels that could protect human
health equally if both are supported by scientific studies. Since health
effects are uncertain, the EPA can defend this choice by claiming that
it chose to rely on or believe the evidence of one study-the one that
would support less costly regulation-over another study. There are
very few limits on the internal use of cost-benefit analysis in the
environmental arena, and like every other federal agency, the EPA
will routinely use cost-benefit analysis as its regulatory paradigm, even
when such usage is not permitted. Moreover, in the case of such
38. Id. at 1154-55 ("Though the phrase 'to protect the public health' evinces an intent
to make health the primary consideration, there is no indication of the factors the
Administrator may or may not consider in determining ... what level of emissions will
provide 'an ample margin of safety.'" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B))).
39. Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1007, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Stack Height
Increase Guideline, 41 Fed. Reg. 7450 (1976).
40. Stack Height Increase Guideline, 41 Fed. Reg. 7452.
41. See, e.g., Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16, 21 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976) (concluding that use of other measures is permitted only when
specific emission reduction techniques are "unavailable or infeasible").
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uncertainty, courts are very likely to approve the EPA's decision
making which informally takes cost-benefit analysis into account.
3. The EPA has legitimate reasons for using
cost-benefit analysis
Although scientific uncertainty makes it possible, one may ask
why the EPA has been utilizing cost-benefit analysis in areas where
it is clearly prohibited from doing so and why the courts have allowed
such an analysis. The answer lies in the values that traditionally have
been considered within the cost-benefit framework employed by
federal agencies, and the attempt by Congress to alter that frame-
work.
On the surface, the concept of strictly prohibiting cost-benefit
analysis seems ludicrous. In theory at least, when considered very
broadly, cost-benefit analysis is always a good paradigm to analyze a
proposed decision. Shouldn't we always want benefits to exceed costs
in whatever we do? Theoretically yes, but too often certain values get
lost in the shuffle. There is no shortage of commentary, academic or
otherwise, condemning federal agency cost-benefit analysis for failing
to consider important criteria or for willfully manipulating the process
to benefit a few at the expense of others.42 The history of the
environmental movement and environmental regulations indicate that
federal agencies did not understand or consider environmental values
in the traditional cost-benefit analysis paradigm employed in the
postwar period.43 Therefore, to protect the environment from
practices and decisions which continued to abuse it, Congress
prohibited a seemingly logical paradigm-cost-benefit analysis-in
certain environmental laws.
In the place of cost-benefit analysis, Congress essentially
authorized federal agencies to conduct a crude "macro-economic"
analysis, giving great weight to previously ignored but now important
environmental values and making them preeminent to traditional
economic values. Traditional cost-benefit analysis could not outweigh
the important values Congress had recognized with respect to the
42. RICHARD 0. ZERBE, JR. & DWIGHT DIVELY, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN
THEORY AND PRACrICE 489-90 (1994).
43. Victor B. Flatt, The Human Environment of the Mind: Correcting NEPA
Implementation by Treating Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Risk Allocation
as Environmental Values Under NEPA, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 86 (1994) [hereinafter Flatt,
Human Environment].
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environment, such as the value that species should not be eliminated
from the earth.' Essentially, Congress identified some unmeasured
values whose preservation was so important it outweighed any
associated costs.
In reality it is very difficult for our society to place an infinite
value on anything, no matter how important. This reality has forced
a change in some of the original broad legislative mandates. Faced
with draconian requirements to curtail their use of cars, some
Americans have decided that maybe pristine air is not so important,
after all and have persuaded their legislators to .take the same
position.45 The implicit use of cost-benefit analysis by the EPA has
occurred even where it was forbidden for the same reason: because
people actually value a net benefit when all values are considered.
Without considering values other than human health or the environ-
ment, some of the laws would impose extreme requirements or
incredible costs without a commensurate increase in benefits. The
EPA has assumed, probably correctly, that in elevating environmental
concerns over others, Congress was merely trying to emphasize
environmental values and did not mean to shut down an entire
industry or way of life, even if the legislative language prohibited
considering the economic cost of regulations.
46
4. The real issue is one of values and whose values
will be used in cost-benefit analysis
If the EPA is already doing a form of cost-benefit analysis, why
is there a need for legislation specifically targeting environmental
regulation? Why is it being pushed so hard and seen as so necessary
to the- economic health of our country? Similarly, why are environ-
mentalists so scared of the proposed bill if the EPA has already been
doing such a cost-benefit analysis? After all, would not everyone
agree that in theory cost-benefit analysis is a good paradigm for
agency decision making? Do we really want to pass legislation that
is more harmful than helpful? As a society we can agree on this
broad principle. What we cannot agree on is what values should be
considered in a cost-benefit analysis. One person may value health
44. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
45. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 specifically forbid the EPA from
controlling air pollution through the addition of certain costs or inconveniences to
automobile travel. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 19, at 257-58.
46. LANDY ET AL., supra note 35, at 56, 65.
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or the risk of impaired health very differently than another. And this
valuation depends on a whole host of considerations, including
economic well-being. In a democratic, pluralistic society, people will
always try to push for the type of regulation that maximizes their
personal cost-benefit equation. Even if we assume people are civic-
minded, the incentive still exists to push for the kind of cost-benefit
equation that they perceive as better for society as a whole: "We
don't need to be free from a minuscule risk of cancer, we need to be
competitive so as to produce jobs." People's differences in under-
standing values and harms and their distinct interpretations of cost-
benefit analysis seems to divide those who support the cost-benefit
analysis in the Job Creation bill from the environmentalists who
oppose it. Because they feel environmental harms are exaggerated,
the proposers of this law favor the kind of traditional cost-benefit
analysis that was done before many of the major environmental laws
were passed. Environmentalists also assume that this is the intended
meaning of the proposed statute, and because they see environmental
harms as more genuine, they oppose a law requiring traditional "cost-
benefit" analysis for environmental regulation.
The language of the proposed Job Creation bill tries to gloss over
this difference in the way values and harms are understood by
asserting that all cost-benefit analysis must be scientifically objec-
tive.47 For instance, the major purpose of the legislation is to
present the public and executive branch with "the most scientifically
objective and unbiased information concerning the nature and
magnitude of health, safety, and environmental risks."48 The bill as
originally proposed also stated that risk assessments "shall explicitly
distinguish scientific findings in risk assessments from other consider-
ations."49 The requirements section of the proposed bill reempha-
47. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 3104(a).
48. Id. § 3102(1).
49. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 3104(b)(1). When introduced jn the House, the
text was altered to read:
When assessing human health risks, a risk assessment shall consider and discuss
both laboratory and epidemiological data of sufficient quality which finds, or fails
to find, a correlation between health risks and a potential toxin or activity.
Where conflicts among such data appear to exist, or where animal data is used
as a basis to assess human health, the assessment shall include discussion of
possible reconciliation of conflicting information, and as appropriate, differences
in study designs, comparative physiology, routes of exposure, bioavailability,
pharmacokinetics, and any other relevant factor.
Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 3104(b)(1). The final version that passed the House
read:
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sized the importance of scientific underpinnings by stating that the
risk assessment shall be based on a "scientific evaluation of the risk
addressed."5"
By basing all of the criteria on science, an attempt is made to
avoid grappling with any difference in interpretation of values and
harms, and instead to look for both an objective and universally
acceptable level of safety. Unfortunately there is no scientifically
objective level of safety for any person or the environment." Risk
assessment is always a matter of statistics, and even if all the statistics
are known, someone still has to make a value judgment as to what it
is worth to protect human life or the environment. There is no
absolute protection. In many cases the scientific studies will not be
certain. This uncertainty requires a value judgment as to which study
or formula seems most reasonable or which would support values that
are more important to us as a society. The ultimate decision before
the agency is not how to calculate what the mathematical studies
show, but how to determine what value society places on various
aspects of our environment. Scientific analysis will not alleviate the
need to determine this.
In the same vein, the proposed peer review requirement seems
to indicate that the problem with agency health and safety regulation
is that it is sloppy or not scientifically accurate when in fact the
When discussing human health risks, a significant risk assessment document
shall contain a discussion of both relevant laboratory and relevant epidemiologi-
cal data of sufficient quality which finds, or fails to find, a correlation between
health risks and a potential toxin or activity. Where conflicts among such data
appear to exist, or where animal data is used as a basis to assess human health,
the significant risk assessment document shall, to the extent feasible and
appropriate, include discussion of possible reconciliation of conflicting
information, and as relevant, differences in study designs, comparative
physiology, routes of exposure, bioavailability, pharmacokinetics, and any other
relevant factor, including the sufficiency of basic data for review. The discussion
of possible reconciliation should indicate whether there is a biological basis to
assume a resulting harm in humans. Animal data shall be reviewed with regard
to its relevancy to humans.
Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 414(b)(1).
50. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 3201(a)(4)(A). As introduced in the House the
clause stated, "scientific and economic evaluation of all significant and relevant information
provided to the agency by interested parties relating to the costs, risks, and risk reduction
or other benefits." Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4. § 3201(a)(5)(A). The final version
read, "scientific and economic evaluations of all significant and relevant information and
risk assessments provided to the agency by interested parties relating to the costs, risks,
and risk reduction and other benefits." Passed H.R, 9, supra note 4, § 422(a)(1).
51. Lynton K. Caldwell, Environmental Policy as a Political Problem, POL'Y STUD.
REV., Autumn/Winter 1993, at 104, 107.
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problem is that people do not agree on the values used. At most, the
peer review requirement52 will slow down the ability of agencies to
promulgate regulations quickly.
5. Because the EPA is in charge of implementation, its values will
be utilized in the cost-benefit analysis, and thus the
real impact of the proposed law will be minimal
Given that the major conflict in the law is really one of values,
what will happen if this law is implemented? Given that the EPA is
already doing cost-benefit analysis for environmental regulations, is
there any reason to think that if this bill passes, the proposed law will
change the way the analysis is done? Will the EPA's regulatory
interpretation change? I believe that the answer is no.
Because of the focus in environmental laws on environmental
values, the EPA has from the beginning been attuned to and
considerate of those values that are at risk when we degrade our
environment. Even though the EPA has conducted cost-benefit
analysis, it appears to have done so with great deference to the
intentions of Congress to give weight to environmental values and
harms. The EPA has yet to allow the regulatory costs to significantly
endanger human health. Although the EPA may fail to recognize
some values in its cost-benefit paradigm, 3 for the most part it is in
tune with the values expressed in the major environmental laws
passed by Congress.
In order to assure the EPA's continued sensitivity, the agency has
also improved its ability to use, compare, and manipulate these values
more fully. Using tools such as contingent valuation methodology, the
EPA can quantify some previously unquantifiable environmental
values, such as existence values.' The federal courts have approved
52. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 3301-3302; Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4,
§ 3301; Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 431.
53. This author argues in two separate articles that environmental philosophy and
environmental risk allocation are important elements to consider when interpreting federal
environmental legislation and accompanying regulations. See generally Flatt, Human
Environment, supra note 43 (arguing that governmental decision makers fail to consider
environmental philosophy and environmental risk allocation as values important to the
NEPA assessment of environmental impacts), Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle Be
Unbroken?: A Review of the Hon. Stephen Breyer's Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward
Effective Risk Regulation, 24 ENvTL. L. 1707 (1994) [hereinafter Flatt, Unbroken?]
(arguing that cost-benefit comparisons of dollars spent per human life saved overlook
other prominent values that many environmental laws are designed to protect).
54. W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation,
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the use of such studies to determine values.5 " In Ohio v. United
States Department of the Interior, the D.C. Circuit thoroughly analyzed
the contingent valuation methodology and determined that the
Department of the Interior could use it to calculate reliable economic
data on natural resource damages. 6 Therefore, a return to the
glorious days of "progress" wherein we only counted "real" or
"traditional" economic costs and benefits is no longer possible by
simply requiring agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. Cost-
benefit analysis has grown up and now can at least recognize-and in
most cases quantify-almost all important values of the environment.
Indeed, the future may hold even greater value for environmental
amenities than the EPA currently assigns.
5 7
There is no reason to assume that if this law passes the EPA will
not continue to use the broad cost-benefit analysis that it currently
uses. Moreover, the federal courts are likely to approve the EPA's
understanding of its statutory duty and its method of cost-benefit
analysis, since the courts apply a very deferential standard of review
to an agency's interpretation.-8
In reviewing an agency's interpretation and implementation of a
statute, a court must first look at whether Congress has directly
spoken on the issue in question. 9 In order to directly control an
agency's interpretation of a statutory charge, Congress must have
"had an intention on the precise question at issue."'  If it did not,
then a court must assume that Congress has given an agency broad
discretion to deal with the issue, and the court must defer to the
agency's interpretation if it is reasonable and consistent with the
statute." This deference to- an agency's discretion, under the so-
J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 19,20. The value of the mere existence of a nonmarketable
commodity-for example, the existence of a fish in a stream-may be measured by asking
the public how much they would be willing to pay for an increase in the quantity of that
commodity. Id.
55. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432,478 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
56. Id. at 474-78.
57. According to John Loomis, an economist at Colorado State University, by
requiring rigorous cost-benefit analysis, Congress may be "opening a Pandora's box" of
stronger valuation of the environment. Eric Pryne, Figuring Price for Priceless Assets is
No Idle Exercise, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 9, 1995, at B1.
58. EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980) (holding that an
agency's interpretation is ordinarily accorded "great deference").
59. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842
(1984).
60. Id. at 843 n.9.
61. Id. at 844-45.
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called Chevron rule, has clearly curtailed a court's power to overturn
an agency's interpretation of a law. Thus, Congress's power to
control an agency's discretion is also greatly limited. The D.C. Circuit
recently reviewed the deference due an agency's decisions and held
that "Chevron commands that unless it is absolutely clear that an
agency's interpretation of a statute, entrusted to it to administer, is
contrary to the will of Congress, courts must defer to that interpreta-
tion so long as it is reasonable."'62 Thus, the EPA should be able to
continue its method of valuation and cost-benefit analysis with the
approval of the federal courts.
Even where values are uncertain, the EPA can consider them in
conjunction with cost-benefit analysis to make estimates. Certainly,
cost-benefit analysis has had a long history of being manipulated to
emphasize the values most important to the decisionmaker.63 There
is no reason to think this manipulation will change, and the manipula-
tor will be the EPA, not Congress. Therefore, unless the EPA's
philosophy changes, it will continue to place a high value on at least
some of those things important to environmentalists.
6. The procedural changes in the proposed cost-benefit
bill may be unenforceable
The procedural changes proposed in this cost-benefit legislation
could be more onerous than the requirement of a cost-benefit analysis
itself, but may not be enforceable under doctrines of administrative
law. Even if the procedural changes are utilized, they will have no
real substantive effect.
Section 3401 of House Bill 9 as proposed in the Contract with
America (Proposed H.R. 9) states that whoever is "adversely affected
by any conduct in violation of this title may in a civil action obtain
appropriate relief. '  Relief includes an award of reasonable
62. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 11
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (Mikva, J., concurring) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
63. ZERBE & DIVELY, supra note 42, at 489-90.
64. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 3401. The House eventually passed the
following:
CIVIL ACION.-An owner who does not choose arbitration, or who does
not receive prompt payment when required by this section, may obtain
appropriate relief in a civil -action against the agency. An owner who prevails
in a civil action under this section shall be entitled to, and the agency shall be
liable for, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs (including
appraisal fees).
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attorney's fees.' Those individuals adversely affected presumably
would be those who could now challenge agency action after its
implementation under the APA.' This provision of Proposed H.R.
9 allows a challenge before a final or emergency rule is implemented
by an agency.67 The challenge could apparently attack the kind of
cost-benefit analysis conducted by the agency-was it truly scientif-
ic?-or the use or failure to use scientifically approved methods or an
appropriate peer review panel.'
Federal courts might use the standing doctrine to preclude any
attempt to allow such a challenge before the final rule is issued.
Although the section states that it would only apply to those adversely
affected-for the most part adopting the APA's standing lan-
guage 69 -before a rule is issued in final form, it would be very
difficult for a party to prove that it had been adversely affected in
order to satisfy the standing requirement."
The problem with section 3401 is that it would be very difficult
for a plaintiff to develop a concrete factual scenario wherein the
alleged harm resulted from the perceived failure to do a correct cost-
benefit analysis before final agency action. Even if it appears that the
incorrect cost-benefit analysis would lead to regulations which might
be costly to a potential litigant, there is no guarantee that the agency
would issue such a regulation until it has completely proceeded
through a rule-making procedure. The agency might not implement
Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 206(e).
65. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 3401. There is no comparable section in either
Introduced H.R. 9 or Passed H.R. 9.
66. Under the APA, actions are reviewable at "final agency action" by persons
suffering legal wrong by agency action or adversely affected by agency action. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 702, 704.
67. Id. § 704.
68. See Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 3104, 3201, 3301-3302; Introduced H.R. 9,
supra note 4, §§ 3104, 3201, 3301; Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 414, 421, 431.
69. Section 702 of the APA states that "a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702.
70. As noted by Justice Breyer and Professor Stewart:
Federal courts, however, traditionally have not recognized the "public action."
They have insisted that the plaintiff establish that he or she has suffered some
specific, tangible injury as a direct result of government conduct in order to
secure judicial review of its legality. A traditional justification for this
requirement is that only plaintiffs with a concrete personal stake will litigate a
case with sufficient adversary vigor ....
STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATO-
RY POLICY 1056 (3d ed. 1992).
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the expected rule based on the challenged cost-benefit analysis or it
might make exceptions for certain individuals or industries.
It is true that a litigant need only show that the litigant is "'likely
to be financially' injured" in order to maintain standing.7 However
this requirement means only that a potentially aggrieved party need
not wait for an enforcement action to begin before challenging a
newly-issued rule. The proposed legislation authorizes a challenge
one step before that: a plaintiff could challenge an analysis that
would lead to a regulation that might lead to an enforcement action
against the plaintiff. Whereas an issued rule states something definite
about an agency's enforcement expectations, a cost-benefit analysis
does not. Therefore, there is insufficient agency action to show a
definite adverse impact on an agency.
The problems with standing also indicate that the concept of
ripeness might prohibit this type of challenge to the EPA's cost-
benefit analysis.72  Under the test in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner,73 in considering the ripeness of an issue a court should
consider the "fitness" of the issue for review, and the "hardship" of
the parties in withholding consideration.74 The Court in Abbott
Laboratories noted that the issue was fit for review because it was
purely legal and did not require the consideration of factual circum-
stances.75
A court does not have to wait for an agency to proceed against
someone in a final enforcement action before an issue is ripe for
review or the court can offer relief. In many cases, facts are fully
present before enforcement begins. In Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. United States,76 the Supreme Court held reviewable
a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation setting forth
proscribed contractual arrangements even though the FCC had not
yet acted upon the rule.77 In that case, the agency had actually
adopted a formal rule outlining its intentions and the applications of
those intentions to the parties. In the case of section 3401 of the
Proposed H.R. 9, on the other hand, whether a cost-benefit analysis
71. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)
(citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940)).
72. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
73. Id. at 149.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
77. Id. at 425.
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has been done properly is much more a factual question that has yet
to be considered by the agency, and one in which even the potential
application to the parties has not even been decided. Although if this
legislation passes, Congress would have clearly intended for litigants
to be able to challenge the cost-benefit analysis directly, there would
be little way in which a court could offer definite relief. If a court
were to defer to Congress to allow this kind of review, the ripeness
analogy indicates why standing would not be present. Due to the
many factors that the EPA is to use in making decisions and its
discretion in weighing them, simple determination of what is cost-
beneficial does not automatically determine what regulation will be
adopted. Ultimately, because the agency would not have issued any
basic rule or intention, the courts would not consider the issue to be
ripe for review, and therefore there would also be no definite harm
to satisfy the standing requirement.
Even if judicial review were to occur at this stage, a litigant
would not be receiving a particularly new right, just a change in the
timing of that right's execution. Challenging an agency analysis of a
regulation's merits can already occur when a litigant attacks the final
agency action. If a challenge to the cost-benefit nature of the
regulation were to be made at an earlier time, collateral estoppel
would prohibit a second consideration of that issue. Thus section
3401 would simply move up the timing of consideration of the issue.
That collateral estoppel applies to agency action is not in dispute.7"
If the circumstances had changed factually between the first challenge
of the analysis and the final rule, thereby limiting the applicability of
collateral estoppel, this same factual alteration would argue for the
inability to consider the issue at the time proposed in this legislation
because of ripeness.
In any event, a challenge to the merits of a regulation is difficult
to pursue in court at any time. Courts are loath to review an agency's
discretionary rulings. Although Congress would, with the passage of
this statute, clearly provide for judicial review, the courts have been
reluctant through the years to overturn agency actions where they
have no basis on which to review the decision.79 Here Congress says
that cost-benefit analysis should be scientifically supportable. If a
court is looking for scientific certainty, however, and the agency does
78. WARREN FREEDMAN, RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 69-70 (1988).
79. Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970).
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not bear the burden of proof, the court has no structure with which
to analyze whether the agency has correctly identified the values that
are subject to scientific uncertainty or how the agency has resolved
the differences in studies that may result from scientific uncertainty."0
Such a requirement might even be overturned as an unconstitutional
delegation of power to an agency because of the lack of standards to
guide the agency's substantive discretion when faced with scientific
uncertainty."'
In the face of uncertainty and the need for substantive analysis,
such issues are still committed to the discretion of the agency.
Congress has given the courts no more direction on how to resolve
such conflicts than they had before, leaving'such decisions in the
agency's discretion.
7. Summary
The impact of the cost-benefit analysis requirement on environ-
mental regulation has probably been overblown. Even if the
requirements are fully implemented, the agency's own regulatory
interpretation of cost-benefit analysis and problems with the procedur-
al changes proposed could ensure that current environmental
regulation will remain relatively unchanged.
B. Compensation of Parties for Reductions in the Value of
Property Brought About by Federal Regulation-
"Private Property Rights Protection and
Compensation" Title
The next part of Proposed H.R. 9 that has caused concern to
environmentalists is the so-called "Private Property Rights Protections
and Compensation" title. 2 This provision seeks to require an agency
80. For a discussion of how different standards of proof would allow the same set of
evidence to support different health conclusions, see Victor B. Flatt, OSHA Regulation of
Low-Exposure Carcinogens: A New Approach to Judicial Analysis of Scientific Evidence,
14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 283, 293-304 (1991).
81. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
687-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist would have invalidated as an
impermissible delegation of power the first sentence of the Occupational Safety and Health
(OSH) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988), which provides that the Secretary shall select a
standard which provides for human health, because in the face of scientific uncertainty
such a grant is broad and has no standards to guide the Secretary. See Industrial Union
lDep't, 448 U.S. at 675 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
82. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 9001-9002; Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4,
§§ 9001-9004. The division as passed by the House was retitled the "Private Property
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to reimburse a party for any lost market value of that party's
land-greater than ten percent-resulting from agency action.
Specifically, this section provides that
[a] private property owner is entitled to receive compensa-
tion in accordance with this section for any reduction in the
value of property owned by the private property owner, that
-(A) is a consequence of a limitation on an otherwise
lawful use of the property imposed by a final agency action;
and (B) is measurable and not negligible. 3
Although the bill has been limited since the original proposal to only
apply to certain environmental laws, this discussion will examine the
impact of the full proposed law on environmental regulation." The
discussion of general environmental impacts applies equally to the
impacts on specific areas of environmental regulation that might be
covered by any successor proposal to the original Contract with
America.
1. What is the potential impact of such required
compensation on environmental regulations?
Under current constitutional law regarding "takings," if a
regulation advances legitimate state interests-without constituting a
physical invasion of the property-a compensable taking occurs only
if no marketable value remains in the property, and then only if the
Protection Act of 1995." Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 201-210. See supra note 9 for the
text of this proposed legislation.
83. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 9001. The version introduced in the House
stated that "a] private property owner is entitled to receive compensation from the United
States in accordance with this section for any agency infringement or deprivation of rights
to property that is owned by the private property owner." Introduced H.R. 9, supra note
4, § 9002(a)(1).
The House passed a more limited version:
The Federal Government shall compensate an owner of property whose use of
any portion of that property has been limited by an agency action, under a
specified regulatory law, that diminishes the fair market value of that portion by
20 percent or more. The amount of the compensation shall equal the diminution
in value that resulted from the agency action. If the diminution in value of a
portion of that property is greater than 50 percent, at the option of the owner,
the Federal Government shall buy that portion of the property for its fair market
value.
Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 203(a).
84. In order to assure passage in the House, the bill was limited to certain
environmental laws, such as the Endangered Species Act, wetlands regulation, and water
rights compacts. See Kenworthy, supra note 2, at A3.
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regulation is not an exercise of a traditional police power." If the
regulation is a particular exaction against an individual property or a
physical invasion of property, the Fifth Amendment may require
compensation for any reduction in economic value of the property.
8 6
Thus, under current constitutional doctrine, legitimate government
regulation of a general nature may lessen the value of land without
the action being a "taking" that would require compensation. In
theory at least, this proposed bill seeks to expand the rights of
individuals not to have private property taken without just compensa-
tion by legislatively providing reimbursement for any major diminu-
tion in the market value of land caused by regulation.'
The theory behind this and other proposals of the Contract with
America is that while environmental protection is a worthy goal, the
government should only allow cost-beneficial levels of environmental
regulation. The government should only allow regulation that
we-the public-are willing to pay for based on an expectation of
benefits from the regulation. According to the logic behind the
proposed bill, to do otherwise is an inefficient use of our nation's
public and private resources. In that sense, the proposed compensa-
tion legislation is seen as a companion to the requirement of a cost-
benefit analysis. Presumably if our government is forced to purchase
environmental, or health and safety, regulations, it will only purchase
those that are cost-effective or cost-beneficial. In a democracy the
people will decide whether it is worth raising taxes in order to gain
environmental protection. The theory that people should receive
compensation for what government takes away from them is a good
and a fair one. Certainly, our founders were concerned enough about
the issue that they passed the Fifth Amendment to prohibit takings
without compensation.
The problem is that the reality behind the compensation
provision does not work as well as the theory. Defining a reduction
in value attributable to regulation is difficult, and, if the law is
interpreted broadly, all kinds of regulations, including important
environmental regulations, may require compensation even if fairness
would not require it. Depending on the definition of market value,
most regulations controlling any land use could potentially diminish
the market value of that property. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed
85. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
86. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994).
87. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 9001(a)(1).
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in Dolan v. City of Tigard, "'Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law."',,
Land has little or no intrinsic value; its value stems from the
bundle of rights for its use granted by the state.89 Historically, this
has brought little conflict in market-valued restriction because the
uses to which most people wished to put their land did not infringe on
the rights of others, so the state did not limit these rights of use.
However, increasing urbanization and higher population density has
resulted in heightened control over land use. Nevertheless, this
control has historically been exercised in a way to benefit all people
by controlling externalities of land usage. The theory of zoning is that
separating incompatible uses, or controlling the externalities of land
use, will increase the value of all parcels.
Despite the beneficial nature of such controls overall, these
controls do change the potential uses and market value of land.
However, this is not the kind of regulation that requires compensation
for purposes of fairness. Property limitations designed to control
externalities do not normally cheat anyone out of property without
just compensation. In purchasing land, the uses to which it can be put
are generally reflected in the market price. Thus, if a couple
purchases a plot of land in a single family zone for $60,000, they are
not cheated simply because if they could build a high-rise on the plot,
the land would be worth $300,000. Of course, people may believe
that the uses of land may change in the future, and they may purchase
land based upon this speculation. The market will reflect some
amount of speculation, and the market price may go up or down
based on the fate of that speculation. But fairness does not require
compensation for a failed speculation.
Although the price of land has not always reflected the environ-
mental restrictions to which land is subject, those restrictions existed
in some form-at least philosophically-because of limitations on the
use of land due to the nuisance doctrine, which prohibits the use of
land in a way that is detrimental to others. Most environmental laws
88. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413 (1922)).
89. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899; Victor B. Flatt, A Brazen Proposal Increasing Afford-
able Housing Through Zoning and the Eminent Domain Powers, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.,
Spring 1994, at 115, 119.
[Vol. 29:585
ENVIRONMENTAL "CONTRACTION?"
can be justified as providing protection to the public from activities of
others.
Unfortunately, though environmental insults are similar to
nuisances, they are not always captured by the theory of private
nuisance law. Sometimes it is difficult to determine which particular
person or group of persons is responsible for the environmental injury
to another, making it nearly impossible to prove the "causation"
element necessary for tort recovery in nuisance actions.' For
instance a party might, by constructing impermeable surfaces or filling
a wetland, cause flooding on his neighbors' property. But when so
many people do the same thing it would be very difficult to prove
causation of the flooding which would lead to a recovery in a nuisance
action.
Under the proposed legislation, however, payment would be
required to compensate for a control of this type of nuisance.9' If
the government tries to regulate the filling of wetlands, it would have
to pay the landowner who forgoes the filling of the wetlands for the
"loss" in value that occurs by preventing-this fill.2 This is true even
if the owner should have known that developing the land might cause
harm to others and if that knowledge was reflected in the price of that
land.93
Thus, this law essentially provides property owners the maximum
value of their land because it prohibits regulation which would lower
that value without compensation, even if the regulation were already
in place and were simply to control harmful externalities of land use.
In essence, this is no different from saying that if any government
90. Flatt, Unbroken?, supra note 53, at 1717; see also Lettie M. Wenner, Environmen-
tal Policy in the Courts, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s, at 189, 190 (Norman
Vig & Michael Kraft eds., 1994) (stating that the plaintiff's burden of proof-to show that
each injury is the fault of a particular polluter-is extremely difficult to prove).
91. The Contract for America proposed that "[a] private property owner is entitled
to receive compensation ... for any reduction in the value of property ... that ... is a
consequence of a limitation on an otherwise lawful use of the property imposed by a final
agency action." Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 9001(a)(1)(A). As introduced, the
legislation entitled the private property owner to compensation from the federal
government for "any agency infringement or deprivation of ights... that... is imposed
by a final agency action on a use of property that would be lawful but for the agency
action." Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 9002(a). The bill as passed, however, states
that "[i]f a use is a nuisance as defined by the law of a State... no compensation shall be
made ... with respect to a limitation on that use." Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 204.
92. See Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 9001(a).
93. Id.
January 1996]
618 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
regulation had an impact on the price of a stock, the government
should compensate the owner of that stock.94
Not only would this legislation require compensation for
regulations for which fairness would not require compensation, but
this legislation might also give a windfall to wealthy individuals and
overcompensate them at the expense of the community. The way the
market works at the moment, environmental harms-and environmen-
tal laws and controls or potential environmental laws and controls
dealing with those harms-are already incorporated into the value of
real property.95 If compensation were to be required for environ-
mental regulations, the market would no longer necessarily value
these certain environmental harms as bad, increasing the value of land
and giving a windfall to current property owners or restoring the
value of the land of property owners too ignorant to recognize the
presence of an environmental hazard on the property at the time of
purchase.96
This system of required compensation creates a paradox in the
market that is unfair to the community. The very act of compensating
the public inflates the market value. Anything that has historically
lowered the market value of a property may require compensation,
thus skewing the market that is supposed to ensure just compensation
and, in turn, making environmental protection more expensive than
it should be.97
The impact of this law on environmental regulation could be
devastating. It seems to go beyond the intentions of fairness to
landowners. By requiring compensation for costs attributable to
regulation, compensation could apply to all environmental regulations,
94. For example, if the FDA does not approve a drug from Company D because the
compound is found to be toxic, and the stock market reacts to that news by dropping the
price per share of D's stock from $55 to $10, the impact of a law such as this one might
be that the government would owe all shareholders $45 per share.
95. These environmental harms include drainage problems, steep slopes, and sewer
and water service.
96. It is possible that the value of land might not go up. If incompatible uses were
allowed to mingle, total value might go down, resulting in everyone being worse off. See
discussion of zoning theory, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
97. Since the law interferes with internalization of external market factors that should
be reflected in the price of land-that is, environmental harms that are attributable to the
use of land-the land is "overpriced" and encourages environmental overuse to the
detriment of all, thereby increasing the "cost" of environmental protection from the
economic optimum. See the discussion of the "tragedy of the commons," ANDERSON ET
AL., supra note 19, at 28-29.
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even those designed to require landowners to pay for external
environmental harms caused by their use of the land. Correct
economic incentives to control environmental harms will be skewed,
and even environmental regulation that society is willing to pay for
may cost far more than necessary.
2. Reducing the legislation's potential impact on environmental
regulations
Agency and court interpretations may reduce the potentially
broad impact of this bill on environmental regulations.
a. environmental regulations may control "unlawful activities"
It may be possible to lessen the impact of this law on environ-
mental regulations by arguing that environmental regulations aim only
to control unlawful activities as that term is used in the proposed
statute.98 The proposed statute specifically states that compensation
would only be provided for a reduction in value occurring from any
lawful activity.99 Although this phrase might be interpreted as
98. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "a
regulation that renders property valueless is not a taking if it prohibits uses of the property
that were not 'previously permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles.'"
(citation omitted)).
99. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 9001(a)(1).
A private property owner is entitled to receive compensation in accordance with
this section for any reduction in the value of property owned by the private
property owner, that-
(A) is a consequence of a limitation on an otherwise lawful use of the
property imposed by a final agency action; and
(B) is measurable and not negligible.
Id. The version introduced in the House read:
A private property owner is entitled to receive compensation from the United
States in accordance with this section for any agency infringement or deprivation
of rights to property that is owned by the private property owner.
(2) Agency infringement or deprivation of rights to property defined.
-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "agency infringement or
deprivation of rights to property" means a limitation or condition that-
(A) is imposed by a final agency action on a use of property that
would be lawful but for the agency action, and
(B) results in a reduction in the value of the property equal to ten
percent or more.
Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 9002(a). The final version as passed read:
The Federal Government shall compensate an owner of property whose use of
any portion of that property has been limited by an agency action, under a
specified regulatory law, that diminishes the fair market value of that portion by
20 percent or more. The amount of the compensation shall equal the diminution
in value that resulted from the agency action. If the diminution in value of a
portion of that property is greater than 50 percent, at the option of the owner,
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simply avoiding compensating a party for carrying on an illegal,
traditionally criminal activity-for example, growing marijuana-if
unlawful activity is interpreted broadly, it is obvious that many of our
environmental regulations control activities that are prohibited by our
environmental laws. For instance, it is unlawful to take a member of
an endangered species."°  Therefore, are regulations designed to
prohibit that taking also precluding the exercise of any otherwise
lawful activity? No, because the activity is unlawful.
The language passed by the House seems to anticipate that
argument by requiring compensation for a regulation specifically
taken pursuant to a regulatory law. 0' Although not in the version
of this legislation passed by the House, if this law is ultimately
enacted, it will almost certainly include a provision allowing regulation
that controls "otherwise unlawful activity." It is still possible that the
activities controlled by environmental regulations would not otherwise
be considered lawful activities because it is possible to characterize
them as public nuisances, which are by definition "unlawful"
activities."~ Even if language excusing regulation that controls
otherwise unlawful activity is not ultimately included, because
environmental laws do control some activities that could be consid-
ered a nuisance, one could argue that environmental regulations may
be created to curb traditionally "unwanted" activities, not simply to
enforce a "regulatory" law.
Environmental insults have often been equated with public
nuisances.0 3 Prior to the enactment of environmental laws, public
nuisance law provided causes of action for emissions from an asphalt
plant"° and for municipal water pollution. °" As early as 1972,
scholarly articles theorized that most of the then newly discovered
environmental harms would be actionable as public nuisances."°
the Federal Government shall buy that portion of the property for its fair market
value.
Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 203(a).
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994).
101. See supra note 99.
102. See John W. Wade, Environmental Protection, tie Common Law of Nuisance and
tie Restatement of Torts, 8 FORUM 165 (1972).
103. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 619-20
(5th ed. 1984).
104. Karpisek v. Cather & Sons Constr., 117 N.W.2d 322 (Neb. 1962).
105. New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931).
106. John E. Bryson & Angus Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 275-76 (1972).
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Indeed, the range of public nuisance has been described as "co-
extensive with the police power itself."'0' 7
Nothing in the legal definition of nuisance would preclude its
application to these traditional environmental harms. The finding of
a nuisance requires physical invasion of the property." Although
this requirement may preclude suits for aesthetic harm, physical
invasion is present in most environmental insults. For instance, broad
interpretations of the physical invasion requirement have included
invasion by air pollution particles. 9
The traditional view also holds that a public nuisance must not
be merely an unlawful activity, but actually a criminal one."0 But
as early as the 1970s, academic discussions speculated that deleterious
impacts on the community do not have to be explicitly "criminal"
under state law to constitute a public nuisance; it is sufficient if a
statute, ordinance, or regulation bars the activity."' Prior to the
enactment of major federal environmental laws, an understanding
existed that there could be a federal common law of nuisance for
environmental harms." 3 Federal environmental laws have taken the
place of these federal common laws."' Since environmental harms
were considered nuisances prior to the enactment of these laws,
however, these harms have always been prohibited or illegal activities.
Therefore, environmental regulations may be the kind of regulations
that do not restrict otherwise lawful activity and therefore do not have
to compensate for the restrictions under the proposed law. Certainly
the courts would have to extend great deference to an EPA interpre-
tation of otherwise lawful activities as excluding polluting activi-
ties." 
5
Arguably the legislation might be void because the government
has an affirmative responsibility to control public nuisances or to
exercise its police power when the public good requires it. Public
nuisances are not particular to any one individual but instead may
107. John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 12 (1993).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1977).
109. ANDERSON Er AL., supra note 19, at 709.
110. KEETON ET AL., supra note 103, at 617-18.
111. Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 106, at 247.48.
112. Id.
113. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
114. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
115. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844-45 (1984).
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affect the community as a whole. 116  Theoretically, individuals
cannot sue in court to enjoin public nuisances unless they have
suffered special damages, because the defendant would face numerous
lawsuits for the same conduct."7 Presumably, the community as a
whole can act through its government to enjoin those nuisances.
However, under the proposed legislation, the government can only
enjoin those nuisances by paying for them, financially burdening
citizens to vindicate their rights to be free from nuisances. To the
extent that this policy enjoins or limits the discretion of a state to
counter environmental hazards, it may be an impermissible infringe-
ment on the police power of the state. Public trust doctrine implies
that the state has a duty to prohibit harm to the community as a
fiduciary for the public good, and this theory includes protection of
natural resources."8 Many commentators have suggested that the
public trust doctrine compels the government to protect the environ-
ment."9 One might argue that this doctrine prevents any proposed
legislation from interfering with that requirement.
Moreover, considering environmental harms as unlawful
nuisances that do not require compensation would not be unfair to
landowners. In terms of the constitutional takings doctrine, if an
activity is a nuisance normally regulated by the police power of a
state, a party is presumed to be on notice that the activity could be
regulated or prohibited without compensation. 20 Landowners who
have notice of a historically regulated activity presumably will suffer
no serious market loss as a result of the exercise of that regulation,
because they obtained the property conscious of possible governmen-
tal limitations on its use.
b. the benefits of environmental regulations may offset
the accompanying costs
Even if these nuisance theories would not render the law
inapplicable to environmental regulations, the EPA might try to
preserve its regulatory power without compensating for any impact on
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977).
117. See id. § 821C.
118. Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 106, at 275-76.
119. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970) (arguing for the use of the
public trust doctrine for resource management).
120. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-2900.
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the property's market value by offsetting the purported costs of the
regulation by the economic benefit received. Under the state's power
of eminent domain, the theoretical model for this legislation, any
special increase of or benefit to land value resulting from a taking is
offset from the loss caused by the taking when calculating just
compensation. 2' How special the value increase must be is the
subject of some contention. Environmental laws that benefit many
people would not be of special or particularized benefit; nevertheless,
the concept has been applied to regulations that give reciprocal
benefits from mutual restrictions."2  Richard Epstein, a strong
proponent of governmental compensation for regulatory diminution
in value, argues that any number of use restrictions and regulations
may not require compensation because of implicit "in-kind" compen-
sation."2
The wording of the proposed bill also suggests a broad under-
standing of offsetting benefits: It explicitly states that the fair market
value is to be determined by subtracting the value of the property if
the agency action were implemented from the value of the property
if the agency action were not implemented. 24 In certain circum-
121. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
911 F.2d 1331, 1342 n.10 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 943 (1991); United States
v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216,221-23 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental
Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829,846-47
(1989) ("When a portion of a tract of land is condemned by the federal government and
the remaining land is increased in value as a result of the government action, courts will
frequently require that the compensation paid to the landowner for the portion taken be
decreased by the value of the benefit to the remainder.").
122. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491
(1987) ("While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit
greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others."); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Lit is reasonable to
conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will
be benefitted by another.").
123. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 195-215 (1985).
124. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 9001(c). The compensation would be: "the
difference between-(1) the fair market value of the property determined based on the
value of the property if the agency action were not implemented; minus (2) the fair market
value of the property determined based on the value of the property if the agency action
were implemented." Id. As introduced in the House, the bill defined the reduction in the
value of private property as:
the difference, if greater than zero, between-
(A) the fair market value of property, as determined based on the
value of the property if an agency action referred to in paragraph (2) or (5)
of section 9002(a), as the case may be, were not implemented; minus
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stances the market is well-attuned to taking all sorts of value into
account; for instance, the market could recognize the value of land
with and without pollution control."z
The practice of requiring a special assessment for a special
benefit, well-accepted in our jurisprudence, also supports the use of
offsets.2 6 If a local improvement enhances the neighborhood, the
neighborhood should pay for it. 27
An environmental regulation such as a prohibition against filling
wetlands may harm the property value by limiting the amount of
buildable space. Conversely, the regulation could help preserve
property values by protecting wetlands as a source of drainage on
other properties, which would possibly restrict flooding on the
burdened property.
Would this be a close enough benefit from the regulation to
qualify the allowance of offsets? It depends on the meaning of the
language of the proposed bill referring to impacts on values. If one
is simply referring to market values, the proven value of a program
does not have to relate exactly to the restrictions it imposes as long
as the marketplace recognizes the value increase. Under takings
jurisprudence, recognition of a legislative action as a legitimate
exercise of police power and not an illegal uncompensated taking
requires a relationship in kind and in proportion between the
proposed development and the exaction imposed. 2 However, this
exact specificity has not yet been imposed upon mere general
regulatory burdens, and in any event it relates more to the issue of
whether the regulation is a legitimate exercise of the police power,
not to the value of compensation.
Certainly, allowing any offset that can be reflected and proven in
market value is logical. Moreover, such an interpretation does not
oppose congressional intent concerning this part of the proposed law.
(B) the fair market value of property, as determined based on the
value of the property if an agency action referred to in paragraph (2) or (5)
of section 9002(a), as the case may be, were implemented.
Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 9004(7). No similar provision appears in Passed H.R.
9.
125. Although if land were broadly harmed by loss of pollution controls, the market
might not reflect this since the supply of dollars to purchase land might be relatively
unchanged, and might bid up the price of available land to its current, environmentally
protected level.
126. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 199 (1893).
127. Id. at 198.
128. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-21.
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Therefore, the EPA could and should have the flexibility under
Chevron to interpret the law to allow offsets in calculating total
reduction in value. 29 This interpretation would. preserve the
fairness in regulation which was the purported driving force behind
the proposal of this law.
Regulatory agencies could try an even larger offset theory by
considering all environmental restrictions as part of a general
environmental protection scheme. In such a case, the EPA might
claim-and presumably environmentalists and the EPA actually
believe-that the sum total benefit of all environmental regulations
exceeds their cost, and therefore benefits would more than compen-
sate for burdens. The difficult practical issue would be tying the
benefits to the particular market value of a property as the market
may have difficulty accounting for a theoretical reduction in value.
It is not difficult to see, however, that a piece of land in a location
with huge amounts of air pollution might have little value because it
is uninhabitable. Michelman has suggested that such a broader offset
theory has been used to justify regulations without compensation
under the eminent domain statute:
Efficiency-motivated collective measures will regularly inflict
on countless people disproportionate burdens which cannot
practically be erased by compensation settlements. In the
face of this difficulty, it seems we are pleased to believe that
we can arrive at an acceptable level of assurance that over
time the burdens associated with collectively determined
improvements will have been distributed evenly enough so
that everyone will be a net gainer.30
Proving this broader offset in a court challenge requesting
compensation would be difficult. Many of these benefits accrue to the
parties who do not pay the costs. Moreover, explicit studies tying
benefits to the market value of land would be very difficult to
produce because few markets exist in a completely unregulated
environment. The approach would be difficult for an agency to
implement. Besides the difficulty in calculations, it also would require
some procedural creativity to discuss all environmental regulations as
one joint-related regulation. Nevertheless, it might be worth an
attempt by the EPA to try and limit the so-called reduction in market
129. Chevron, 467 US. at 843.
130. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1225 (1967).
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value occurring from a regulation by considering all regulations
together. 131
A similar agency approach would involve the agency charging
customers for their services to make up any monetary payouts caused
by the proposed bill. This charge might be a waiver of compensation
rights in order to receive benefits from other environmental laws or
a direct assessment on parties that benefit from environmental
controls, similar to special assessments.
Local jurisdictions often require impact fees from new develop-
ments or tie some services, such as sewer treatment, to the cost of
environmental controls.'32 Similarly, the EPA might be able to
secure an impact fee of a waiver of market value compensation in
order to allow someone to commit an environmentally polluting act
that is otherwise legally prohibited. If a company wanted to expand
a coal-fired plant in a dirty air area requiring a new air permit, the
EPA might be able to secure a waiver of compensation for the benefit
of its overall air pollution control scheme as the price of granting the
new permit. The EPA might even secure a waiver of compensation
for restricting development on wetlands as the price of a new air
permit. Such a plan would not really short circuit the point of this
law because the companies or individuals would presumably enter into
it willingly and recover the market value in another arena. The total
benefit to a company from an action must be higher than without it
or the company would not have entered into the particular transac-
tion. If companies enter into this plan voluntarily to seek market
profits, the arrangement is not unfair. Congress has not addressed
this issue particularly, and nothing within the proposed legislation
seems to forbid such an interpretation. Therefore, under Chevron,
the EPA could interpret the rule in this way.
33
An agency could also directly assess benefit impact fees on
companies and individuals in order to compensate others for market
value losses that would accompany regulation. Local jurisdictions
often use such a scheme in the form of public improvement districts
to assess the cost of a public improvement to the people who benefit
131. In addition, it has the added benefit of focusing the agency on cross-media and
related forms of pollution and its effects on the environment and livability.
132. Daniel S. Huffens, Dolan Meets Nollan: Towards a Workable Takings Test for
Development Exactions Cases, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 30, 35 (1995).
133. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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even when the benefits cannot be determined exactly." Assuming
that the proposed improvement is cost-beneficial, there should be
sufficient revenue from those benefitting from an improvement, such
as cleaner air, to subsidize any of the costs of the program required
to pay for the loss of market value for another. This approach has
the advantage of directly having those who benefit from a regulation,
or at least some of those who benefit, pay for it. Unfortunately,
agencies such as the EPA do not directly have the legal power to
impose such assessments, making it difficult to impose assessments on
all who benefit from a program. However, many agencies do have
the power to impose fees for administrative costs of their pro-
grams,'35 and if the new market differential payouts could be
considered regulatory costs or costs of administering the program,
then perhaps fees could be assessed against some of the people who
benefit.
For instance, under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,'36
all point sources of water pollution must be permitted.3 7 There is
a charge for such a permit to reflect the benefits of providing the
clean water permit system, 13 8 and the charge could also reflect the
administrative costs of a payout to reduce market impact.
Of course all of these schemes suffer from the difficulty of
matching the benefits of a program to those individuals or companies
that would bear the cost. Theoretically, even if agreeing to an.
environmental regulatory scheme were profitable for a company or
individual, or even if a landowner receives benefits from a regulation,
is it fair to force only the parties who are subject to regulation to pay
for the benefits to society as a whole? It seems that this is one of the
purposes behind the proposed bill-to make the public pay for the
environmental protection it wants and not to have the costs fall
disproportionately on one group.
This again poses a question of societal values, and ultimately, of
course, the people decide upon the values. Implementation of this bill
as proposed, without allowing agencies to use offsets in calculating the
134. Nancy J. Hoffneier Zamora, Comment, New Financing Strategy for Rapid Transit:
Model Legislation Authorizing the Use of Benefit Assessments to Fund the Los Angeles
Metro Rail, 35 UCLA L. REv. 519, 520-21 (1988).
135. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(5)(E) (Supp. V 1993) (authorizing the EPA to
impose permit fee requirements under the Clean Air Act).
136. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
137. Id. § 1342(a).
138. See id. § 1342(a)(5).
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market value, presents the American people with a direct choice of
how much environmental protection is wanted. As proposed, this law
would have required compensation even for zoning, which has partial
takings impacts implicit in every regulation, and it may provide an
unexpected windfall depending on the method of calculating the
market price.'39 The Republican majority was probably not elected
for its position on the environment, and if this legislation is out of
sync, such a proposal may be repudiated. Thus, there may be a closer
examination of which values are important. This proposed legislation
strongly values the rights of individuals to go beyond the just
compensation required by the Constitution in order to compensate
individuals without requiring a duty to the community. Ultimately,
the effectiveness of this proposal will depend on whether our society
values this duty to the community.
c. Limitation on Unfinded Federal Mandates-Title X
The first part of the Job Creation portion of the Contract with
America to pass both the House and Senate was the limitation on
unfunded federal mandates. 4 This portion of the bill specifies that
a federal agency can only enact a federal mandate limiting or dic-
tating the activities of local government to the extent that the federal
government pays the costs of the mandate.41 Federal mandates are
139. Richard L. Robbins, Introduction-Land Use and Zoning: Illinois' LaSalle National
Bank Criteria and Municipal Constitutional Liability, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 7 (1984).
140. John H. Cushman, Jr., Congress Limits Federal Orders Costly to States, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at Al, B8. See supra note 7 for a history of the unfunded mandates
provision.
141. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 10502. This provision was removed to the
Unfunded Mandates Bill. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 104 Pub. L. No. 104-
4, § 2, 109 Stat. 48, 48-49. The new statement of policy reads:
The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to strengthen the partnership between the Federal Government and
State, local, and tribal governments;
(2) to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration by Congress,
of Federal mandates on State, local, and tribal governments without adequate
Federal funding, in a manner that may displace other essential State, local, and
tribal governmental priorities;
(3) to assist Congress in its consideration of proposed legislation establishing
or revising Federal programs containing Federal mandates affecting State, local,
and tribal governments, and the private sector by-
(A) providing for the development of information about the nature and
size of mandates in proposed legislation; and
(B) establishing a mechanism to bring such information to the attention
of the Senate and the House of Representatives before the Senate and the
House of Representatives vote on .proposed legislation;
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defined as any federal program-not related to statutes regarding
discrimination or constitutional provisions-that requires a state or
local government to "undertake an activity or provide a service."'
142
(4) to promote informed and deliberate decisions by Congress on the
appropriateness of Federal mandates in any particular instance;
(5) to require that Congress consider whether to provide funding to assist
State, local, and tribal governments in complying with Federal mandates, to
require analyses of the impact of private sector mandates, and through the
dissemination of that information provide informed and deliberate decisions by
Congress and Federal agencies and retain competitive balance between the
public and private sectors;
(6) to establish a point-of-order vote on'the consideration in the Senate and
House of Representatives of legislation containing significant Federal intergov-
ernmental mandates without providing adequate funding to comply with such
mandates:
(7) to assist Federal agencies in their consideration of proposed regulations
affecting State, local, and tribal governments, by-
(A) requiring that Federal agencies develop a process to enable the
elected and other officials of State, local, and tribal governments to provide
input when Federal agencies are developing regulations; and
(B) requiring that Federal agencies prepare and consider estimates of
the budgetary impact of regulations containing Federal mandates upon
State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector before adopting
such regulations, and ensuring that small governments are given special
consideration in that process; and
(8) to begin consideration of the effect of previously imposed Federal
mandates, including the impact on State, local, and tribal governments of Federal
court interpretations of Federal statutes and regulations that impose Federal
intergovernmental mandates.
Id.
142. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 10506(2)(A)-(B), 10506(3)(A)(i); Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, § 101, 109 Stat. at 50-60 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 658 (1994)).
The new law defines a federal mandate as either a "Federal intergovernmental mandate"
or a "Federal private sector mandate." § 101, 109 Stat. at 51-52. Those terms are defined
as:
(5) FEDERAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANDATE.-The term
"Federal intergovernmental mandate" means-
(A) any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation that-
(i) would impose an enforceable duty upon State, local, or-tribal
governments, except-
(I) a condition of Federal assistance; or
(II) a duty arising from participation in a voluntary Federal
program, except as provided in subparagraph (B)) [sic]; or
(ii) would reduce or eliminate the amount of authorization of
appropriations for-
(I) Federal financial assistance that would be provided to
State, local, or tribal governments for the purpose of complying
with any such previously imposed duty unless such duty is reduced
or eliminated by a corresponding amount; or
(II) the control of borders by the Federal Government; or
reimbursement to State, local, or tribal governments for the net
cost associated with illegal, deportable, and excludable aliens,
including court-mandated expenses related to emergency health
care, education or criminal justice; when such a reduction or
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In addition, the bill requires study of past federal mandates with
the objective of altering or suspending current unfunded federal
mandates that "are not vital to public health and safety."'43 Thus,
in theory, the bill prevents any agency enforcement of federal
mandates, past or present, that are not funded.
3. How does this bill affect environmental regulations?
This bill has a mixed impact on environmental regulations.
Where federal programs impose requirements on states to enforce
laws against private polluters, the impact should not be too great due
to the way these programs are structured. Some environmental laws
and regulations allow a state to set up a bureaucracy to tailor
enforcement.'" These laws and regulations would not necessarily
elimination would result in increased net costs to State, local, or
tribal governments in providing education or emergency health
care to, or incarceration of, illegal aliens; except that this sub-
clause shall not be in effect with respect to a State, local, or tribal
government, to the extent that such government has not fully
cooperated in the efforts of the Federal Government to locate,
apprehend, and deport illegal aliens;
(B) any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation that relates to a
then-existing Federal program under which $500,000,000 or more is
provided annually to State, local, and tribal governments under entitlement
authority, if the provision-
(i)(I) would increase the stringency of conditions of assistance to
State, local, or tribal governments under the program; or
(II) would place caps upon, or otherwise decrease, the Federal
Government's responsibility to provide funding to State, local, or tribal
governments under the program; and
(ii) the State, local, or tribal governments that participate in the
Federal program lack authority under that program to amend their
financial or programmatic responsibilities to continue providing
required services that are affected by the legislation, statute, or
regulation.
(7) FEDERAL PRIVATE SECTOR MANDATE.- The term "Federal
private sector mandate" means any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation
that-
(A) would impose an enforceable duty upon the private sector
except-
(i) a condition of Federal assistance; or
(ii) a duty arising from participation in a voluntary Federal
program; or
(B) would reduce or eliminate the amount of authorization of
appropriations for Federal financial assistance that will be provided to the
private sector for the purposes of ensuring compliance with such duty.
Id.
143. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 10503(a)(2)(E); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995, § 302(a)(3)(D), 109 Stat. at 68.
144. See, e.g., National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988
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fall under the provisions of this bill. Even though these provisions
require state outlays to operate the state enforcement programs, these
laws and regulations merely allow a state to run a program, they do
not require it. 45 Of course, there are incentives for a state to take
on this responsibility- primarily the expectation that federal enforce-
ment programs by an agency such as the EPA would be much more
draconian and expensive for citizens of the state. But merely because
it may be preferable for a state to take on a costly program does not
elevate the statutes or regulations allowing such programs into
mandates. Moreover, the provisions allowing for state enforcement
seek to preserve flexibility at the local level, a concept generally
favored by the authors of the Contract with America, and these
provisions would likely be seen as voluntary flexibility, not unfunded
federal mandates.
Unlike the Clean Water Act or the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, the Clean Air Act includes more stringent provisions
requiring state enforcement of programs and does require each state
to propose and carry out an air pollution permitting plan.'46 How-
ever, since statutory authorization and requirement of application fees
for state services provide funding, this type of program is not likely
to receive criticism as an unfunded federal mandate.47
Other required state enforcement provisions in the Clean Air Act
probably would be considered unfunded federal mandates. The Clean
Air Act requires the creation of a state implementation plan (SIP) for
controlling air pollution, with only partial funds granted to a state to
create the plan.'" However, even though this could technically be
considered an unfunded federal mandate, it is not clear that the states
would desire a change in this program because most states presumably
want to maintain flexibility of enforcement to avoid more rigorous
enforcement plans by the EPA. Nevertheless, this proposed bill might
ultimately allow many states to drop SIPs unless subsidized by the
federal government. Of course, the environmental health of these
& Supp. V 1993) (regulating storm water discharge through a permit program); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(mandating cradle-to-grave ownership of hazardous waste).
145. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344; 42 U.S.C. § 6926.
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1988 & Supp.-V 1993).
147. Id. § 7661a(b), (d).
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7410 (1988).
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states might be better served by federal enforcement, but the burden
on federal funds will make meaningful enforcement problematic.,"
This bill will probably most affect the regulation of state, and
local governments as polluters in their own right. A requirement that
localities undertake specific sewage treatment seems to be an
"activity" required by the federal government that might require
funding.' Newspaper commentators have seen a similar potential
effect 5'
In this instance, the impact of the unfunded mandates provision
is particularly harmful to environmental health because it requires the
federal government to pay states and localities not to pollute even
though pollution may be an externality associated with voluntary
activity. Like the requirement that the government compensate all
people for regulations which lower the value of property, this
unfunded mandates provision enshrines the principle that individuals
or entities, in this case state and local governments, have a "right" to
pollute regardless of the harm to others. Just as in the private
compensation scheme, this policy also lessens market efficiency by
subsidizing pollution and changing pollution levels from the optimum
level suggested by a market that internalizes all costs and benefits.
But the effects, of the unfunded mandates provision go even
farther than the fair compensation provisions of the Contract with
America discussed in part II.B. Unlike the requirement for compen-
sation of private landowners for lower property values, there is no
opportunity here for the government to offset the benefits of pollution
control on costs to the state or local government because market
value is not a consideration.'52 Any required costs simply must be
paid. Thus, unless paid for by the federal government, this provision
149. When this provision is considered with other provisions of the Contract with
America, such as the limitation on regulatory costs to the private sector, it becomes clear
that direct federal enforcement of environmental regulations on the private sector may be
impossible, amplifying the impact of any reduction in state regulation.
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988). Although there were grants for treatment plants, id.
§§ 1281-1299, and some potential waiver of these requirements by statute which ended in
1994, id. § 131 i (h), federal funding has not been complete for purposes of applying for the
sewage treatment facilities required to be in compliance with regulations passed in
compliance with the Clean Water Act. Passage of the unfunded federal mandates bill
would presumably require funding by the federal government for sewage treatment
facilities of localities even though those localities are creating the pollution to be
controlled.
151. Ivins, supra note 3, at B5.
152. See supra part II.B.
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ensures no requirement controlling state and local government
pollution. Since states and localities are often the biggest polluters in
some mediums such as water, 53 any lessening of the pollution
control provisions over these entities could have serious consequenc-
es.15
4
4. How can the potential impact of the bill on
environmental regulation be lessened?
The alternatives for blunting the impact of this provision are
limited. The EPA might assert that the regulations requiring states
and localities to control pollution may not meet the definition of
unfunded federal mandates set out in the statute. As noted above,
regulations or statutes that enforce the constitutional rights of
individuals are not federal mandates as defined in the proposed
bill.'55 Federal statutes and regulations that control governmental
pollution might be seen as enforcing individual constitutional due
process rights. Prohibiting the federal government from passing laws
that internalize harmful externalities to those who cause them might
violate the right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 56
Laws prohibiting the complete compensation of individuals for
damages caused by torts against them, which is an externality of an
action, may violate due process rights. In Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group,'57 a case which considered
this proposition, the Supreme Court held that the Price-Anderson
Act's $560 million limitation on tort damages liability for operators of
nuclear power plants in the event of a nuclear accident did not violate
due process rights to recovery.' 58 The Court's decision was based
on the extremely remote likelihood of such an accident and because
if the harms caused by such an accident exceeded the established
damages limit, Congress would presumably step in to make plaintiffs
153. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 19, at 334-35.
154. Of course, certain federal requirements may not lead to the most efficient control
of pollution. Serious questions have been raised about the effectiveness of sewage
treatment facilities, particularly given their very high cost.
155. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 10506(2)(B)(i); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995, § 4(1), 109 Stat. at 49.
156. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
157. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
158. Id.
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whole.'59 Although the majority stated that it was unsure that a
limitation on recovery in tort would raise constitutional due process
questions, it did recognize that prior limits on tort recovery had been
coupled with a tradeoff of another benefit for potential plaintiffs,
presumably because of due process concerns."6  In capping tort
awards in worker's compensation schemes, state courts have noted
that to avoid constitutional challenges the limitations must be
reasonable and there must be a fair trade off. 6'
Similarly, the disallowance of control of public nuisance by
government entities also interferes with the ability of a person "to be
made whole," and may violate the right to due process, an individual
constitutional right. Therefore, the proposed bill might be inapplica-
ble to environmental regulations under its own terms.
Nevertheless, this is an unusual interpretation of individual
constitutional rights and may not be the interpretation of this bill by
an agency or a federal court, leaving the full impact of the bill
unchanged. As noted above, if such a bill does go into effect with full
force, it will shift much of the cost of pollution control to the federal
government. Because it alters appropriate economic incentives for
pollution control at the state and local level, it will probably increase
the overall costs of the same level of pollution control.
D. Limitation on the Total Amount of Regulation
Allowed-Title IV-"Establishment of
Federal Regulatory Budget Cost Control"
Another related part of the Contract with America that has
particular implications for the environment and environmental
regulatory agencies is the section that seeks to limit the overall cost
to the private sector of complying with all federal regulations. 6 2
Although the general Contract with America discussion proposes to
limit the amount of regulation to a certain percentage of the gross
domestic product (GDP), the proposed legislation does not make that
restriction explicitly.63 Instead, the proposed legislation requires (1)
that the aggregate cost of private sector compliance with all regula-
159. Id. at 84-87.
160. Id. at 88-90.
161. See 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 19 (1958).
162. REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., supra note 20, at 126, 132:
163. Id. at 132.
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tions be calculated as a percentage of gross domestic product;"6 (2)
that any budget passed after enactment of this bill specify changes in
laws and regulations
necessary to reduce the aggregate direct cost to the private
sector of complying with all Federal regulations by 6.5
percent for the budget year (as measured against the
aggregate regulatory baseline for the first budget year to
which this part applies) and by equal percentage increments
for each of the outyears (until the aggregate level of such
costs does not exceed 5 percent of the estimated gross
domestic product for the same fiscal year as the estimated
costs that will be incurred);
65
(3) that the aggregate total dollar value that can be imposed as
compliance costs on the private sector in any budgetary cycle be
allocated between house subcommittees to parcel out to executive
branch agencies as total amounts of compliance costs that their
regulations can impose on citizens;' (4) that it will be out of order
for any chamber to propose a law that would impose a cost on the
private sector that exceeds the allotted cost of regulation for that
sector, unless consideration of that law receives three-fifths approval
by that chamber;'67 and (5) that any House committee which
imposes costs on the private sector in excess of its allotted totals may
face a bill given preferential procedural treatment in the House to
"prohibit the issuance of regulations and rules by any agency under
the jurisdiction of that committee for the fiscal years covered by that
allocation."' "6
This bill establishes a maximum regulatory cost burden on the
private sector which will be reduced every budget cycle until it is only
five percent of the GDP. 69 It requires House subcommittees to
164. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 4001(a) (adding § 321(a)(2) to the Congressio-
nal Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297). For the text of this section see
supra note 11.
165. Id. (adding § 323(a)(1) to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, 88 Stat. 297).
166. Id. (adding § 323(b) to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297).
167. Id. (adding § 323(c) to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297).
168. Id. (adding § 323(e) to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297).
169. Id. (adding §§ 321(a)(5), 323(a)(1) to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297).
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divide the aggregate regulatory cost, burden allowed between them
and the executive branch agencies under their jurisdiction. Whether
or not existing laws and regulations are specifically cut-and only
recommendations are required by this law-if regulations proposed by
agencies under the jurisdiction of the various subcommittees will
impose compliance costs on the private sector in excess of the
assigned allotment, the House alone will be able to vote on a highly
privileged bill, subject to little debate, which will prohibit the issuance
of any new rules and regulations of any agency under the jurisdiction
of that subcommittee. Moreover, in order to consider any new law
calling for regulations imposing costs on the private sector in excesp
of the aforementioned allotment, the consideration must receive
three-fifths approval from both Houses.
As written, the bill could have enormous impacts on the
effectiveness of federal environmental regulation, but it is probably
not constitutional. The bill does not itself specifically force an annual
reduction in imposed regulatory burdens on the private sector.
Instead the bill requires subcommittees to propose reductions,
eliminates all regulation of agencies which fail to meet these goals,
and prohibits normal consideration of laws that would exceed these
burdens. These sections may be unconstitutional because they seek
to create changes in the law without going through the constitutionally
required process of voting by both Houses and presentment to the
President. 7
In INS v. Chadha, the United States Supreme Court examined
the legislative veto, a process wherein one or both Houses of
Congress could overturn a decision by an executive branch agency
with which it disagreed.' Chadha, an Indian national fighting a
deportation action, received special permission to remain in the
country from an immigration judge, acting on behalf of the Attorney
General.'72 Congress subsequently overturned this executive action
based on a provision in the law governing immigration decisions
stating that if "either the Senate or the House of Representatives
passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the
suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon
deport such alien."'73
170. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-52 (1983).
171. Id. at 923-24.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 925 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1988)).
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The Supreme Court overturned this provision of the United
States Code as unconstitutional, holding it constituted an attempt by
the legislature to exercise its legislative authority without having the
law approved by both Houses of Congress and presented to the
President for signing. 4 The Court reasoned that whether actions
of the legislature are "an exercise of legislative power depends not on
their form but upon 'whether they contain matter which is properly
to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.' ",75 The
Court determined that the action was legislative because it "had the
purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of
persons ... outside the Legislative Branch.'
176
Here the proposed legislation does not contain an overt
legislative veto such as the one at issue in Chadha. However, it does
not avoid the constitutional problem entirely. Although the proposed
legislation is designed to thwart administrative action by apparent
procedural, as opposed to legislative, measures of Congress, these
procedural measures effectively alter legal rights established previous-
ly by the legislative process.
For instance, under the provisions of this bill, a law may have
been passed by both Houses and signed by the President, but it might
not be enforced at the executive branch level because the implemen-
tation would add to the private sector's aggregate compliance cost.
If an agency implemented a regulation, in compliance with the validly
passed law anyway, thus exceeding its private sector impact allotment
and forcing the House subcommittee that has jurisdiction over it to
exceed its allotment as well, the House alone could vote to prohibit
passage of that regulation and any other new regulations from that
agency and any other agencies under the House subcommittee that
would exceed its private sector impact allotment.1 7 This unilateral
veto retained by the House, which prohibits new regulations called for
by law, is probably unconstitutional: as in the legislative veto in
Chadha, this veto allows one house to unilaterally override the legal
effect of a validly passed law.
Moreover, the very consideration of such a law causing an agency
or subcommittee to exceed its allotment cannot take place under the
proposed bill without the support of three-fifths of both houses.
174. Id. at 952.
175. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)).
176. Id.
177. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 4001(a).
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Although this requirement is defined as "procedural," its effect is
substantive, therefore it may also be unconstitutional because it is not
consistent with the proper procedure specified in the Constitution for
passage of laws. Instead of the constitutionally required passage by
both houses on majority votes with presentment to the President, this
law, by requiring a three-fifths vote for consideration, requires that
three-fifths of both houses pass certain bills or laws before the
President can sign them into law.
A congressional subcommittee's legislative act of altering
regulations that affect the private sector by suspending their enforce-
ment may also render the proposed bill unconstitutional. In a
concurrence in Bowsher v. Synar,'78 Justice Stevens observed that
giving control of budgetary reductions or restrictions that could alter
national policy to a "component" or "agent" of Congress violated the
procedural requirements of Article I- "passage by both Houses and
presentment to the President." '79
Here, by forcing congressional agencies to select which validly
passed laws they will give effect to based on executive branch agency
priorities, Congress is allowing policy to be made by a subagency of
the Congress, and not the Congress as a whole. Congressional power
under the proposed bill has been limited to an overruling of these
provisions by a three-fifths vote, a provision accentuating the true
legislative power given to the congressional subcommittees.
To rein in the costs imposed on the private sector by the federal
agencies in a constitutional manner, Congress may have to specifically
look at regulations to cut them in a particular way. Forcing Congress
to make these hard decisions is very difficult and may be the reason
behind the allocation of such power to congressional subcommittees
and the agencies themselves. But the Constitution requires that laws,
or in this case the effective repeal of laws, be made in specific
ways."' As now constituted, the manner in which this bill seeks to
reduce the regulatory burden on the private sector appears unconsti-
tutional.
Even if the law is not unconstitutional, it is potentially a very
unwise and blunt instrument from an environmental standpoint
178. 478 U.S. 714,737 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court in Bowsher declared
the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act" unconstitutional. Id. at 736 (holding unconstitutional
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C. § 901 (1988)).
179. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring).
180. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954.
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because it fails to distinguish between true outside regulatory costs
added to the private sector and the forced internalization of costs
which should have been on the private sector in the first place. If a
law and accompanying regulations simply forbid a company to pollute
the air with recognized hazardous air chemicals like arsenic, under the
proposed bill the company's cost of controlling its pollution might be
calculated in the aggregate total amount of regulatory compliance cost
that can be put on the private sector, even though the company
arguably has no right to put toxic chemicals into the air. Since it is
an externality of production, economists would argue that such a cost
is more properly seen as one that ought to be considered a cost of
production, not a regulatory cost from outside.
Nevertheless, this proposed bill does not make that distinction,
and, just as with the provisions dealing with compensation for takings
and the prohibitions on unfunded federal mandates, this has the effect
of giving polluters the right to pollute. It is like saying that a law
prohibiting a person from stealing costs that person all of the money
that could have been stolen, and that the government should
therefore reimburse the person for that amount.
However this distinction may provide a way for the subcommit-
tees or oversight agencies such as the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), which may initially calculate compliance costs, to
exempt from the calculation all of those costs that could be fairly
ascribed to the internalization of costs that should be paid by the
private sector. It is not easy to predict whether the OMB or
congressional subcommittees would be inclined to view costs in this
way, but it is logical, and it makes a distinction between costs imposed
to comply with regulations that control lawful activities solely for the
benefit of others and costs imposed to internalize effects of activities
which would rise to the level of a public nuisance if not controlled.
This interpretation would then preserve environmental regulation that
simply requires the private sector to control its pollution.
E. Alteration of Procedural Rules and Challenges
In addition to the procedural provisions that deal specifically with
agency actions and costs upon the private sector, several separate
parts of the Contract with America would alter the procedural rules
for challenging or commenting on proposed or final agency action.""
181. I have already referred to the special procedural dispensation given to citizens to
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These proposed rule changes will also affect environmental regula-
tions. For lack of a better term, and in recognition of the placement
in the Job Creation section, these could be considered collectively as
"Lawyer Employment Bills."
1. Creation of additional opportunities for public input
The "Administrative Procedure Reform Act of 1995 '18' alters
public interaction with agencies."s3 Section 7003(a)(2) amends the
APA by requiring that public hearings be held on a proposed rule if
100 persons "acting individually" comment on the rule.' 4 Also, if
100 people acting individually request an extension of the comment
period for a proposed rule, the comment period is to be extended by
thirty days."5 This change to the APA probably has very little
substantive impact. More than likely, it may simply delay rules or add
costs to the commenting period. Adding costs to the regulatory
process may seem odd in a section that is designed to lessen the
impact of costs overall, but it shows an apparent distrust for the
responsiveness of the executive branch agencies to the general public.
On a more cynical note, it is simply a way to hamper the agencies
from doing their regulatory jobs effectively.
2. Expansion of regulatory impact analysis
Of greater probable effect is that part of the bill that expands
regulatory impact analysis requirement to anything affecting more
than 100 persons or totalling more than one million dollars.'86 This
challenge the application of cost-benefit analysis to certain bills and to challenge whether
the bills are themselves cost beneficial. See supra text accompanying notes 64-81.
182. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 7001-7008. For a further discussion of these
sections see supra note 12.
183. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 7003; Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 7003;
Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 323.
184. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 7003(a)(2); Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4,
§ 7003(a)(2); Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 323(a).
185. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 7003(b); Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4,
§ 7003(b); Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 323(b).
186. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 7004(b). Passed H.R. 9 would amend title 5
of the U.S.C. to define a major rule for regulatory impact analyses as one:
"likely to result in-
"(A) an annual effect on the economy of $50,000,000 or more;
"(B) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries,
Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic regions, or
"(C) significant adverse effects on competition, employment,
investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-
based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and
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provision is also enforceable individually by a civil action."g
Regulatory impact analysis examines the total -cost impact of
regulations, presumably so agencies can do a better job of cost-benefit
analysis. By requiring such an analysis for many more regulatory
decisions, this provision requires a major study for what have in some
instances been common administrative decisions. This provision could
hold up environmental protection responsiveness in cases which
require decisions on an almost individual level and could increase the
cost of environmental regulation overall. The additional requirement
of more regulatory impact analysis, particularly to more routine
agency actions, will slow the pace .of environmental regulations.
President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,291 created the original
requirement for a regulatory impact analysis." s This executive
order is credited with restraining the scope and volume of new
environmental regulations since that time. 9
Of course federal agencies might be able to play with the
definition of costs somewhat, just as they might in interpreting other
sections of the Contract with America. If a regulation simply
internalizes costs that should be borne by a party in any event, or if
an agency proscribes unlawful activity, the cost might not be counted
in the total cost of an agency rule which determines the applicability
of regulatory impact analysis.
3: Requirement of impact analysis for indirect effects
Section 6002 of Title VI expands the definition of what is to be
considered an impact in determining the effect of regulation on small
entities, stating that "'[i]n determining ... whether or not a rule is
likely to have a significant impact on a substantial number of small
entities, an agency shall consider both the direct and indirect effects
of the rule.'""' Indirect effects of rules are not defined, but
certainly this provision intends to expand those kinds of costs which
can be attributed to regulation. This definitional change will provide
information allowing an agency to consider costs and benefits more,
export markets ..
Passed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 321.
187. Proposed H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 7008. Neither Introduced H.R. 9 nor Passed
H.R. 9 contained this provision.
188. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194 (1981).
189. Richard Andrews, Risk Based Decisionmaking, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
THE 1990s, supra note 90, at 211.
190. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, § 6002 (substituting for 5 U.S.C. § 611 (1994)).
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fully and, depending on how costs are calculated or allocated, will also
provide information that will make regulations appear more burden-
some on small entities. The focus on costs to the private sector
resembles the effect of the other provisions of the Contract with
America, and it can be seen as either good or bad, depending on
whether one thinks costs are being imposed unfairly on the private
sector or whether one thinks members of the private sector must
simply internalize costs that they generate.
4. Requirement of agency consistency
The last general procedural provision affecting environmental
regulation is found in the "Private Sector Whistleblowers Protection
Act of 1995."'9' The Whistleblowers Act seeks to protect members
of the private sector from retaliatory agency action if they complain
about certain prohibited agency activities, such as arbitrary action,
mismanagement, waste or misallocation of resources, endangerment
of public health or safety, coercion, personal favoritism,or other kinds
of discriminatory acts and enforcement." 2 A challenge under this
act may be brought in court and if an agency loses, it will have to pay
attorney's fees and costs.93
On its surface, the Whistleblowers Act sounds eminently fair, as
in general we have objective and consistent regulations to avoid the
kind of favoritism that accompanies arbitrary, individually-based
decisions. The problem is that such a law may take away any and all
flexibility from an agency trying to do its job in the most efficient
manner possible.
One of the greatest complaints about agency action today is that
it is too bureaucratic and costly and applies rules so technically as to
create absurdities in regulation. Certainly, many of those who support
the passage of the Job Creation section of the Contract with America
would agree to this premise. But in order to avoid regulations that
seem absurd or overly bureaucratic, some flexibility must be main-
tained in regulation. That flexibility is usually seen in the agencies'
approach to enforcement actions of previously enacted rules. At the
level of individual enforcement, an agency may often be able to look
at the particular circumstance of a violation of a rule and may make
individual enforcement decisions based upon the unique factors of
191. Id. §§ 8201-8209.
192. Id. §§ 8202-8203.
193. Id. § 8207(b)(5)(E).
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that case. Since an agency is prohibited both constitutionally and
statutorily from taking an action that is arbitrary and capricious, such
creative enforcement is usually fair given the circumstances of the
case.
94
Nevertheless, it may outwardly appear that an agency that has
specifically tailored enforcement to the facts of an individual violation
deals with citizens in an inconsistent or discriminatory manner. The
Whistleblowers Act prohibits this and thus may limit the flexibility of
agency enforcement. This proposed provision of the Whistle-
blowers Act effectively states that agencies may not regulate at all or
must regulate with a very big and a very broad brush.'96
Agency interpretation might lessen the impact of this provision.
It is possible that an agency could cite distinguishing features of
individual cases to justify a difference in treatment, and this usually
satisfies the arbitrary and capricious standard as long as the action
does not appear to be malicious or in bad faith.'" But it is danger-
ous to take on such challenges when attorney's fees are also at risk.
If this provision passes and the agency still chooses to regulate, the
provision will impede the agency's flexible and efficient response.
This provision then will lessen agency enforcement overall, which
could have a negative impact on environmental regulation and
ultimately on environmental health and safety.
III. CONCLUSION
An examination of the Contract with America does indeed reveal
that certain provisions of the Contract might have deleterious impacts
on current environmental regulation. Many parts of the Contract with
America seek to make it very difficult or costly to pass new regula-
tions, and current regulations are subject to diminishment over time.
In theory, the motivation may be seen as noble; indeed, the authors
claim that they do not intend to reduce environmental safety or
protection of human health, just to make it more balanced and sane.
However, many provisions slash overall programs or make them more
costly without conducting an in-depth examination of their true costs
and benefits. Even where this legislation tries to support its view of
194. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Gadsden v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 126, 128 (Ct. CI.
1948).
195. Introduced H.R. 9, supra note 4, §§ 8204-8205.
196. Id.
197. BREYER & STEWART, supra note 70, at 476-77.
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balanced regulation by insisting that the proper amount of environ-
mental regulation will come about from impartial scientific judgment,
the foregoing analysis indicates that science also does not provide the
answers or the most beneficial level of environmental regulation.
At the crux of the conflict over the Contract with America's
impact on the environment is a competition among visions of the way
life should be lived and of the way our society may value certain
amenities, including environmental ones. The Contract with America
represents one vision. But because our courts have given regulatory
agencies great authority in how they interpret many of their provi-
sions,"' it is not clear whether Congress's vision of environmental
values will prevail. There are constitutional challenges that can be
brought against the proposed legislation as well as possible ways that
the EPA can lessen the apparent impact of the changes proposed in
the Contract with America by how it defines costs and benefits.
To the extent that the EPA or environmental organizations fail
to blunt the changes which the Contract with America may bring, it
will force the American people to confront how they want to proceed
with environmental protection. Although the system is imperfect,
presumably that confrontation will move us toward the type of
environmental protection and environmental enforcement that we as
a society need and want.
198. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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